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ARTICLES 
WHO IS MAKING INTERNATIONAL TAX 
POLICY?: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS 
POWER PLAYERS IN A HIGH STAKES WORLD 
Diane Ring∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
In a world in which international tax policy is no longer 
predominantly within the purview of the individual state, and the 
number of important international tax questions has grown 
dramatically, where is the locus of power? If there are many 
questions regarding international tax policy, and if they must be 
evaluated beyond the level of the individual state, where is the 
evaluation taking place? Who is directing it and what is the 
nature of their influence? These questions all point to the 
examination of international organizations in shaping tax policy. 
Certainly both state and nonstate actors, including international 
organizations, actively research, debate, and advocate for tax 
policy. Moreover, to the extent that states and others are coming 
together to discuss and contemplate questions of international 
tax, their conversations usually occur within the context of 
organizations. Such organizations, therefore, have the potential 
to wield influence and power over tax policy choices. Are these 
international organizations exercising influence? In what form 
and to what effect? Should we be concerned about their role? 
Despite the importance of international organizations in tax 
policy, there has been relatively limited research devoted solely to 
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research assistants, Clyde Choi, Doug Dorval, Marissa Dungey, Elizabeth Kinsman, 
Eileen Lee, and Matthew Mauntel for their valuable work. 
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this issue.1 Extensive international relations (“IR”) literature 
contemplates international organizations from both a theoretical 
perspective and, in many cases, an empirical perspective with the 
study of specific bodies.2 However, this literature devotes very 
little attention to evaluating how international organizations 
influence tax policy and what the implications of that influence 
might be. 
This Article begins the process of mapping the inquiry into 
the role of international organizations in tax policy. It identifies 
four basic questions that must be addressed and specifies the 
more sophisticated inquiries that must then be undertaken. This 
Article commences the empirical examination through two case 
studies: one regarding inclusion of a mandatory arbitration 
clause in the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (“OECD”) Model Tax Convention on Income and 
Capital, and one regarding recent international efforts to curb 
“harmful” tax competition. Part I outlines the rising importance 
of international tax matters and the reasons that international 
organizations are likely to be exerting some measure of influence 
on policy. Part II, drawing upon the current literature on 
international organizations and their operations, designs a 
research agenda to reveal the influence that international 
organizations hold over tax policy. As Part II discusses in greater 
detail, this inquiry is not monolithic. Instead it recognizes the 
multiplicity of forums for international tax discussions and the 
varying ways in which participants use them. Part III then turns to 
the two cases studies: one studying the OECD’s and the 
International Chamber of Commerce’s (“ICC”) role in the 
 
1. There is an emerging body of research in the tax field with interesting projects 
on related questions. See, e.g., Arthur Cockfield, The Rise of the OECD as Informal “World 
Tax Organization” Through National Responses to E-Commerce Tax Challenges, 8 YALE J.L. & 
TECH. 136 (2006) (addressing the shortcomings of the existing international regime for 
dealing with cross-border tax issues arising in electronic commerce); Allison Christians, 
Networks, Norms, and National Tax Policy (Univ. of Wis. Law Sch. Legal Research Paper 
Series, No. 1078, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=135861 (exploring the 
international channels used to develop norms regarding national tax policies). 
2. See, e.g., ROBERT W. COX ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF INFLUENCE: DECISION MAKING 
IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1972); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD 
ORDER (2004); GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES: ACHIEVING GLOBAL 
JUSTICE (Christian Barry & Thomas Pogge eds., 2005); THE WTO AS AN INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION (Anne O. Krueger ed., 1998); Kalypso Nicolaidis & Gregory Shaffer, 
Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes: Governance Without Global Government, 68 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 263 (2004–2005). 
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emerging global acceptance of mandatory arbitration provisions 
in tax treaties, and one following the efforts of the past decade to 
generate a response to harmful tax competition. Finally, the 
conclusion offers some preliminary observations about the 
involvement of international organizations in tax policy and 
important avenues for further research. 
I. WHY DOES THE SOURCE OF TAX POLICY MATTER? 
Neither the existence of international tax problems nor the 
existence of international tax organizations is new. As early as the 
1920s, countries found the need to consult with each other on 
pressing matters of international tax, especially the question of 
double taxation. Countries pursued these interactions through 
forums—first the ICC, and then the League of Nations.3 Why 
should we now address how international organizations may 
influence or shape tax policy? Escalation in the volume and 
significance of cross-border business and its taxation has 
enhanced the need for settings in which to resolve tax matters of 
this kind. International flows now total US$1.9 trillion per day.4 
The increasing amounts of money at stake in business 
transactions, and inevitably in the tax system, heighten the 
likelihood of clashes between and among states and taxpayers, as 
seen in the growing tensions over tax competition, transfer 
pricing, and thresholds for taxing nonresident businesses. Even 
the popular press followed the unfolding story in 2008 and 2009 
involving the United States, Switzerland, and UBS.5 U.S. 
taxpayers had sought to hide their income offshore with the 
assistance of certain banks, including UBS, that helped the 
taxpayers disguise their ownership of their funds.6 As part of the 
ongoing saga, the United States sought to compel UBS to 
 
3. See Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S. 
International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1066–77 (1997). 
4. JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE OECD INITIATIVE ON TAX 
HAVENS 1 (2009), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40114_20081202.pdf. 
5. See, e.g., Lynnley Browning, Deal on Names Cracks Swiss Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
20, 2009, at A1; Lynnley Browning, U.S. Asks Court to Force UBS to Provide Names, N.Y. 
TIMES, July. 1, 2008, at C3; David S. Hilzenrath, IRS, Justice Target Undisclosed Assets in 
Swiss Accounts, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2008, at D01. 
6. See Browning, supra note 5. 
RING_K-FINAL 5/22/2010 2:58 PM 
652 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:649 
disclose certain client records.7 Ultimately, UBS agreed to pay the 
United States US$780 million in fines.8 
Although “hard” law,9 including international tax law, 
remains the formal province of the state, or two states in the case 
of tax treaties, such unilateral or bilateral exercises of tax policy 
are inadequate. Some questions can be settled through the 
bilateral treaty process, but many more benefit from the input 
and interaction of more than two states. This interaction is often 
prompted, facilitated, or structured by at least one international 
organization. Thus, despite the formal, hard law power of the 
state over international tax policy, international organizations 
influence the actual design of international tax policy and tax 
rules in a variety of ways, up to and including the creation or 
exercise of “soft law” power.10 
For many years, a large portion of the tax work with which 
international organizations became involved centered on model 
treaties—the traditional output of the League of Nations, the 
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (predecessor 
to the OECD), and the United Nations (“U.N.”).11 Today, 
 
7. As of the end of July 2009, the United States and UBS reached an agreement in 
principal regarding the request of the United States for the names of 52,000 U.S. 
taxpayers holding offshore accounts through the bank. See J.P. Finet et al., U.S., UBS 
Reach Deal on John Doe Summons; Practitioners Discuss Potential Ramifications,” 146 Daily 
Tax Rep. (BNA) K-2 (Aug. 3, 2009). 
8. See JACKSON, supra note 4, at 3. 
9. See Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, How Hard vs. Soft Law Interact in 
International Regulatory Governance: Alternatives, Complements and Antagonists in 
International Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706, 707 (2008) (defining hard law as “legal 
obligations of a formally binding nature,” such as legislation, treaties, executive orders, 
and judicial decisions); see also Allison Christians, Hard Law & Soft Law in International 
Taxation, 25 WIS. INT’L L.J. 325, 326 nn.5–6 (2007) (contrasting the types of hard and 
soft law in the international arena). 
10. International relations (“IR”) scholars use the term “soft law” to refer to an 
organization’s ability to create norms and guidelines that do not carry the force of law, 
but nevertheless create a sense of obligation to which states may conform. In the world 
of international tax policy, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (“OECD”) is a primary proponent of soft law power, establishing model 
tax treaties, which are then widely adopted by member states. See, e.g., Christians, supra 
note 9, at 331–32; Cockfield, supra note 1, at 167; see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, 
International Tax as International Law, 57 TAX L. REV. 483, 497–500 (2004) 
(characterizing some OECD standards as customary international law); David R. 
Tillinghast, Commentaries to the OECD Model Convention: Ubiquitous, Often Controversial; but 
Could They Possibly Be Legally Binding?, 35 Tax Mgmt. Int’l J. (BNA) 580 (2006) 
(describing the force of the rules promulgated by the OECD). 
11. See, e.g., Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 3, 1066–77. 
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international organizations of varying size, scope, composition, 
and mission consider questions of transfer pricing, electronic 
commerce, financial instruments, and business restructurings, 
just to identify a few. In some cases, this work ultimately emerges 
in the form of a treaty, but the manifestation of these efforts has 
expanded far beyond the treaty format to include guidelines, 
recommendations, and topical reviews.12 
II. FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 
The widely shared view that international tax policy 
constitutes a significant dimension of contemporary global 
economic, political, and social policy13 renders a comprehensive 
and systematic inquiry into tax policy formation essential—with 
particular attention to the role of international organizations. 
Drawing upon IR theory’s work in international organizations, 
Part II begins this process by developing a framework for 
examining the role of international organizations in tax policy. 
A. Defining International Organizations 
Before contemplating the influence and power of 
international organizations, it is essential to define the object of 
inquiry. IR literature has defined international organizations as 
 
12. For a listing of guidelines promulgated by the OECD, for instance, see OECD 
Guidelines, http://www.oecd.org/findDocument/0,3354,en_2649_37427_1_119820_1_
1_37427,00.html (last visited April 3, 2010). 
13. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalizatin, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of 
the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573 (2000) (examining the broad social and 
economic implications of U.S. responses to tax competition); Allison Christians, 
Sovereignty, Taxation and Social Contract, 18 MINN. J. INT’L L. 99 (2009) (discussing the 
development of global norms that may constrain national tax policy bargaining); Tsilly 
Dagan, The Tax Treaties Myth, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 939 (2000) (offering a critique 
of tax treaties and their impact on developing countries); Steven A. Dean, Philosopher 
Kings and International Tax: A New Approach to Tax Havens, Tax Flight, and International 
Tax Cooperation, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 911 (2007) (arguing that a sophisticated vision of a 
national tax policy and the measure of gross domestic product might lead the United 
States to pay tax havens to help enforce U.S. tax laws); Ruth Mason, Tax Expenditures and 
Global Labor Mobility, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1540 (2009) (noting the distortional labor effects 
of the disconnect between countries that provide social welfare benefits through 
taxation and countries that consider the worker a resident); Ilan Benshalom, The New 
Poor at Our Gates: Global Justice Implications for International Trade and Tax Law, 85 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1 (2010) (considering the meaning and plausible application of equity concepts 
in international tax). 
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“purposive entities, with bureaucratic structures and leadership, 
permitting them to respond to events.”14 Clearly such a broad 
conception sweeps under its mantle many different types of 
organizations in terms of membership, power, function, and 
mission. 
In many cases, “international organization” is used almost 
synonymously with “governmental international organization”; 
that is, an entity whose members are states or their 
representatives. The U.N.15 is a prototypical example of such an 
entity—a formal organization, with structure and leadership, 
whose members are states. The European Union (“EU”),16 
though markedly different, would also satisfy this broad 
definition. 
Where this conception of “international organization” 
predominates, the analysis often turns to considerations of 
sovereignty and whether, how, and to what degree the 
international organization is usurping the traditional sovereign 
powers of its member states. Although sovereignty questions are 
 
14. Robert O. Keohane, The Analysis of International Regimes: Towards A European-
American Research Programme, in REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 28 
(Volker Rittberger ed., 1993). As this Author has noted elsewhere, it can be useful to 
differentiate international organizations, international regimes, and international 
institutions. The terms can, in some contexts, be used in an overlapping and generalized 
manner, but the IR literature generally envisions a distinct meaning for each term. See 
Diane Ring, International Tax Relations: Theory and Implications, 60 TAX L. REV. 83, 96 
(2007). The broadest category, international institutions, constitute “persistent and 
connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain 
activity, and shape expectations . . . includ[ing] formal intergovernmental or 
transnational organizations, international regimes, and conventions.” Robert O. 
Keohane, The Analysis of International Regimes, in REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 23, 28 (Volker Rittberger ed., 1993) [hereinafter Keohane, International 
Regimes]. Thus, international institutions include both international organizations as 
defined above in the text, and international regimes, which are generally understood as 
“implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around 
which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” Robert 
O. Keohane, Cooperation and International Regimes, in PERSPECTIVES ON WORLD POLITICS 
85 (Richard Little & Michael Smith eds., 1980); see also Keohane, International Regimes, 
supra (“Regimes are institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments, that 
pertain to particular sets of issues in international relations.”). 
15. See generally UN at a Glance, http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/index.shtml (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
16. See generally Basic Information on the European Union, http://europa.eu/
about-eu/basic-information/index_en.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
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important,17 the sovereignty question is less relevant in this 
examination of power and influence for two reasons. 
First, although state-based international organizations play a 
pervasive and significant role in international tax policy, their 
position is not exclusive. Other kinds of international 
organizations with nonstate members18 are on the international 
scene and exert influence, as discussed below. It is improbable 
that any one organization would fully occupy the field of tax 
policy, especially where organizations may have competing 
agendas, and where states still serve as the source of hard law in 
international tax. Thus, the multiplicity of active organizations, 
only some of which have state-based membership, renders the 
sovereignty question a side issue in this context. 
Second, even when considering organizations that do have 
states as members, the core questions include the nature of the 
organization’s influence, how it is exercised, how the 
organization’s positions are formulated, and how the 
organization interacts with others. Potentially, a state-based 
organization that exercises its influence effectively and can 
translate its positions into broader tax policy may also be an 
organization that appears to usurp the sovereignty of its member 
states.19 An inquiry into this possible usurpation20 presupposes an 
 
17. See Diane Ring, What’s at Stake in the Sovereignty Debate?: International Tax and the 
Nation-State, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 155 (2008). 
18. Some scholars challenge even the conception of identifying actors as state 
versus nonstate, arguing that this formulation disguises the variability among states and 
obscures the potential roles that a variety of actors play. See, e.g., Peter Willetts, 
Transnational Actors and International Organizations in Global Politics, in THE 
GLOBALISATION OF WORLD POLITICS 356–83 (John Baylis & Steve Smith eds., 2001). 
Although this point has merit, for the purposes of this Article’s inquiry into 
international tax policy, which remains formally in the control of national governments, 
the state versus nonstate classification of organizations is relevant. That said, the analysis 
herein reveals the complicated relationship among state-based organizations and 
nonstate actors over international tax policy. 
19. See, e.g., JAMES E. DOUGHERTY & ROBERT L. PFALTZGRAFF, JR., CONTENDING 
THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY 32–33 (2001) 
(examining competing views on the health of the modern state); ALAN JAMES, 
SOVEREIGN STATEHOOD 3 (1986) (noting assertions by some observers that “sovereignty” 
is on the decline); Jessica T. Matthews, Power Shift, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.–Feb. 1997, at 50, 
53 (describing nongovernmental organizations as increasingly powerful and capable of 
taking over state functions and shaping future state function). 
20. See Ring, supra note 17 (contending that although arguments based on tax 
sovereignty can serve solely as rhetoric, there are important functional roles and 
normative values at stake when a state exercises “tax sovereignty”). 
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“effective” international organization, which is what this paper 
seeks to examine.21 
As suggested earlier, there are a number of international 
organizations involved in tax policy that are not state-based, such 
as the International Fiscal Association (“IFA”)22 or the Business 
and Industry Advisory Committee (“BIAC”).23 Many of the 
international organizations have a nonstate membership base 
that includes businesses, tax professionals, and academics.24 Of 
course this category itself is not homogeneous. IR scholars 
distinguish among transnational actors on several different 
dimensions. For example, these organizations can operate under 
widely varying formats. Some organizations, such as multinational 
corporations and international nongovernmental organizations, 
like the International Committee of the Red Cross,25 display a 
formal structure with clear formation documents, bylaws, and 
specified rights and obligations of the participants. Others 
exhibit an organizational relationship that may be more aptly 
characterized as a “network,”26 although formal organizations 
may also be discerned within this class.27 The International Tax 
Dialogue (“ITD”), for instance, might constitute a more formal 
network.28 Another important dimension along which nonstate 
 
21. Subsequent analysis of the long-term impact of international organizations on 
tax policy and on the nation-state would be a complement to this Article’s mission to 
develop a comprehensive vision of international organizations and their role in tax 
policy. 
22. See generally What Is IFA? http://www.ifa.nl/organisation/what_is_ifa/ (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
23. See generally About BIAC, http://www.biac.org/aboutus.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 
2010). 
24. See infra notes 50–71 and accompanying text. 
25. See generally Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, ICRC in Action, Ref. 0728/002 (Nov. 
2006), available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/p0728/$file/
icrc_002_0728.pdf (providing a brief descriptive on the object of the organization). 
26. See Thomas Risse, Transnational Actors and World Politics, in HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 255, 255 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2002) (defining 
networks as “forms of organization characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, horizontal 
patterns of communication” (quoting MARGARET KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS 
BEYOND BORDERS: TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 8 
(1998))). 
27. See Risse, supra note 26, at 256–57. 
28. See id. The International Tax Dialogue (“ITD”) is an arrangement among 
various entities, including the OECD, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank; its 
purpose is to facilitate discussion among state leaders, international organizations, and 
“other key stakeholders.” About the ITD, http://www.itdweb.org/pages/
help.aspx?id=17&lang=3 (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). By facilitating such discussion, the 
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organizations are divided concerns their motivations. Some of 
these transnational actors are more clearly “interest groups” 
because they are primarily motivated by their own well-being, for 
example BIAC or the ICC.29 Others arguably seek to promote a 
broader vision of public well-being as characterized by the 
different kinds of knowledge-based advocacy groups,30 such as 
the European Association of Tax Law Professors (“EATLP”)31 or 
the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (“IBFD”).32 
Still another division among these organizations can be 
made on the basis of criminality. All of the organizations 
mentioned thus far in this Article or listed in the Appendix are 
legal bodies. But the universe of international organizations is 
not limited to legitimate bodies. International criminal 
organizations can display the same kinds of influence, power, 
reach, and function as “legitimate” organizations.33 Though they 
might not play a dramatic role in tax policy, recognition of that 
possibility heightens the appreciation for the forces operating on 
a global level. 
This initial examination of what constitutes an international 
organization not only provides boundaries for this Article’s 
inquiry, but also highlights the important place for IR scholars 
and literature. How does the preexisting literature on 
international organizations orient our own inquiry into tax 
policy? As discussed in the following sections, we can draw upon 
this body of research to determine the relevant questions, the 
concerns to address, and the issues that warrant caution. The 
research agenda crafted for international tax need not start from 
zero. The recent and rich attention to international 
 
ITD hopes to help identify good tax practices and allow states to work toward 
cooperation on tax issues. Id. 
29. See generally What Is ICC?, http://www.iccwbo.org/id93/index.html (last visited 
April 3, 2010). 
30. See Risse, supra note 26, at 258 (observing that the profit/nonprofit line roughly 
captures this divide, but only serves as an initial grouping guide; moreover, the two 
categories likely reflect ends of a spectrum). It is important not to attach undue 
significance to this differentiation between organizations and the likely value of their 
respective contributions. 
31. See generally Aim of the EATLP, http://www.eatlp.org/index.php?itemid=54 
(last visited April 3, 2010). 
32. See generally About IBFD, http://www.ibfd.org/portal/AboutIbfd.html (last 
visited April 3, 2010). 
33. See Willetts, supra note 18, at 367–68. 
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organizations in the IR literature reflects a general, though not 
completely unchallenged, shift34 away from viewing the world as 
constructed by state-based, state-dominated relationships to one 
seen as a highly interconnected “global society” shaped by a 
range of forces (e.g., norms, rules, international law) and actors 
(e.g., states, state-based international organizations, 
multinational corporations, transnational networks).35 Having 
established that international organizations operate at the heart 
of international tax policy, this Article will next craft an approach 
to study and evaluate their role. 
 
34. This shift reflects the continuing tension in IR theory between the two 
important traditions framing the debate: neorealism and neoliberalism. Although both 
traditions presume that states are the central (and rational) players in international 
policy making, the neorealists consider states to be more strongly motivated to achieve 
relative gains over other states; thus, power dynamics become pivotal. See KENNETH M. 
WALTZ, THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 102–28 (1979); see also, e.g., Kenneth 
Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations, 42 J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 6 (1998); Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The 
Logic of Two Level Level-Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427 (1988); Peter J. Spiro, NGOs in 
International Environmental Lawmaking: Theoretical Models 9 (Temple Univ. Beasley Sch. of 
L. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 2006-26, 2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=937992 (citing PETER NEWELL, CLIMATE FOR CHANGE: NON-
STATE ACTORS AND THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF THE GREENHOUSE 128–36 (2000)). In 
contrast, neoliberalism, which is also discussed as “neoliberal institutionalism” following 
the work of Robert Keohane, Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics, in 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE POWER: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
THEORY 1, 2 (Robert O. Keohane ed., 1989), views states as engaging in a market model 
calculus of self-interest when deciding what steps to take in their international relations. 
The shift in the literature away from the primary role accorded states is considered 
more reflective of a complex reality. See, e.g., Willetts, supra note 18, at 356 (“Greater 
clarity is obtained by analysing intergovernmental and intersociety relations, with no 
presumption that one sector [e.g., the states] is more important than the other.”). 
Pluralism, which examines “the role of individuals, bureaucracies, and 
nongovernmental organizations in decision-making at the international level,” and 
cognitivist theory, which views “knowledge and information as critical to the shaping of 
international dynamics,” have additionally shaped the evolving IR research agenda. 
Ring, supra note 14 at 91, 93. 
35. See, e.g., Michael Barnett & Kathryn Sikkink, From International Relations to Global 
Society, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 62, 62–64 (Christian 
Reus-Smit & Duncan Snidal eds., 2008). Terminology in these analyses is not fixed. The 
“international organizations” category is considered broadly and could potentially cover 
state-based organizations, non-state-based organizations, multinational corporations, 
and many versions of transnational networks. The category is also frequently used to 
connect with the origins of these studies in the post–World War I period where state-
based international organizations dominated the stage. See Risse, supra note 26, at 257 
(discussing the nature of IR in the twentieth century). This Article uses the term in its 
encompassing manner and then relies on more descriptive categories, such as state-
based organization or multinational corporation, to draw distinctions. 
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B. Unpacking the Power of International Organizations: A Taxonomy 
for International Tax 
Regardless of the type of international organization under 
scrutiny, certain questions must be answered to create a clearer 
sense of the dynamic of their particular international relations. 
This section identifies the four basic inquiries: (1) membership, 
(2) structure, (3) agenda setting, and (4) output, and provides 
some initial examples of the utility of the information. With this 
preliminary information established, more nuanced 
examinations of the dynamics in international tax policy 
formation can be undertaken. 
1. Elements 
a. Membership 
This question of membership harkens back to the early 
academic examinations of international organizations following 
World War I. These analyses were descriptive in form and 
premised on an idealistic belief in international cooperation.36 At 
that time, observations of international organizations emphasized 
their formal composition, including membership. But the events 
leading up to World War II diminished the analytical importance 
of international organizations, and also increased interest in the 
normative views of realism that emphasized power over 
cooperation and idealism. The dramatic growth in international 
organizations after World War II restored attention to the 
organizations themselves. The inquiry, however, remained 
focused on international organizations as concrete entities “with 
a physical presence—names, addresses, and so on.”37 The 
narrowness of these questions and their implicit confirmation 
that only entities capable of having such formal elements could 
be active international players ultimately faded with the growing 
appreciation of international “regimes” and “institutions.”38 
Although an examination of the membership of an 
organization only begins to provide a full picture of the 
 
36. See Arthur A. Stein, Neoliberal Institutionalism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 35, at 201, 202. 
37. Id. at 203. 
38. See, e.g., Jackson supra note 4, at 5, 10. 
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organization’s potential, these are questions that nonetheless 
must be addressed. Consider, for example, the frequent 
comparison between the U.N. and the OECD. The latter, which 
has regularly been derided as a rich country’s club,39 stands in 
contrast to the U.N., with its much broader base of state 
membership.40 In terms of raw numbers, there are 192 member 
states within the U.N.,41 but only 30 states that make up the 
OECD.42 A significant difference in both membership size and 
composition could plausibly be expected to impact the agendas, 
goals, and operations of each organization. In fact, the basic 
differences between the U.N. and the OECD model income tax 
treaties are regularly attributed to the U.N.’s greater 
commitment to developing nations.43 
Membership size can also correlate with the organization’s 
mission; membership may be very small where the organization’s 
mission is limited in scope, of narrow interest, or of a sensitive 
nature. Consider, for example, the Pacific Association of Tax 
 
39. See, e.g., James Salzman, Labor Rights, Globalization and Institutions: The Role and 
Influence of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
769, 776 (2000) (describing the OECD as “an amalgam of a rich man’s club”); Reuven 
S. Avi-Yonah, Tax, Trade, and Harmful Tax Competition: Reflections on the FSC Controversy, 
21 TAX NOTES INT'L 2841, 2844 (2000) (noting that the OECD “is still identified as the 
rich countries’ club”); see also No Breakthroughs Expected at Industrialized Nations Meeting, 
L.A. TIMES, May 17, 1988, at A11 (referring to the OECD as the “rich countries club”). 
OECD members include, among others, Australia, France, Germany, Japan, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. See Ratification of the Convention on the OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,3343,en_2649_201185_1889402_1_1_1_1,00.htm
l (last visited April 3, 2010). Save for Mexico, Poland, and Turkey, none of the other 
OECD member states are “developing” countries. See World Bank Country Groups, 
http://go.worldbank.org/D7SN0B8YU0 (last visited April 3, 2010). For analytical 
convenience, the rubric used to classify the above countries as “developing” is that set by 
the World Bank. See World Bank Country Classification, 
http://www.worldbank.org/data/countryclass.htm (last visited April 3, 2010). 
40. Current U.N. members include, among many others, Albania, Bangladesh, 
Chad, El Salvador, Haiti, and Somalia—certainly not among the wealthiest or most 
powerful of nations. See Member States of the United Nations, http://www.un.org/
members/list.shtml (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
41. See Member States of the United Nations, supra note 40. 
42. OECD, Members and Partners, http://www.oecd.org (select “About OECD,” 
then “Members and Partners”) (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
43. See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. of Experts on Int’l 
Cooperation on Tax Matters, Report on the Fourth Session (20–24 October 2008), ¶ 23, U.N. 
Doc. E/2008/45, E/C.18/2008/6 (2008) (noting that the U.N. Model Income Tax 
Treaty would continue to operate as a “model for treaties between developing and 
developed countries” and that “the focus in the Committee’s mandate on the needs of 
developing countries” would continue). 
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Administrators (“PATA”), which was organized in 1980 to 
facilitate the exchange of information among the member 
administrators.44 Ultimately, PATA came to focus on developing 
coordinated approaches for transfer pricing reporting and 
bilateral advance pricing agreements.45 PATA’s four members, 
Australia, Canada, Japan, and the United States,46 all share 
developed economies, significant interactions through cross-
border business, and a basic commitment to addressing tax 
enforcement and transfer pricing. The group’s size and strong 
interest in transfer pricing47 likely facilitated its detailed transfer 
pricing enforcement work. PATA was eventually superseded in 
2006 by an initiative known as the Leeds Castle group,48 a ten 
member body devoted to national and global tax administration 
matters, with a particular emphasis on mutual enforcement 
issues.49 The expansion hints at the need to include some 
additional partners to effectively reach the kinds of cases and 
questions dominating the tax administrators’ agendas. 
The examples noted above all consider organizations with 
states as members, but many active international tax 
organizations operate with nonstate membership. The growth 
and significance of such organizations supports the supposition 
of neoliberal institutionalists, pluralists, and others who contend 
 
44. See Susan C. Borkowski, The History of PATA and Its Effect on Advance Pricing 
Arrangements and Mutual Agreement Procedures, 17 J. INT’L ACCT. AUDITING & TAX’N 31, 31 
(2008). 
45. See id. at 32–33. For more information on the transfer pricing documentation 
produced by the Pacific Association of Tax Administrators (“PATA”), see Pacific 
Association of Tax Administrators (PATA) Transfer Pricing Documentation Package 
(June 24, 2009), http://www.irs.gov/businesses/international/article/
0,,id=156266,00.html. 
46. See Borkowski, supra note 44, at 32. 
47. See Pacific Association of Tax Administrators (PATA) Transfer Pricing 
Documentation Package, supra note 45. 
48. See Australian Taxation Office, Tax Havens and Tax Administration (Feb. 12, 
2010), http://www.ato.gov.au/individuals/content.asp?doc=/content/
46908.htm&page=25&H25. 
49. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-202, at 24 (2010). The ten members of the Leeds Castle 
group are the original four members of PATA plus China, France, Germany, India, 
South Korea, and the United Kingdom. See Allison Bennett, Everson Says Discussions on 
Expanding Joint International Shelter Group Under Way, 13 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) I-1 (Jan. 
22, 2007) (paraphrasing remarks of then Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) 
Commissioner Mark Everson on the first meeting of the Leeds Castle group). The 
commissioners of the member state tax administrations meet annually. See Australian 
Taxation Office, supra note 48. 
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that states and state-based organizations do not define the 
universe of relevant actors in international tax.50 The shared 
eagerness of these IR scholars to expand the inquiry beyond 
state-based international organizations masks underlying 
theoretical and empirical disputes among IR theorists over the 
“real” role and power of international organizations. Certainly, 
the mere volume of these organizations does not prove their role 
and power relative to states and state-based organizations. 
However, their number and variety indicates their likely 
importance, and at the very least warrants evaluation. The 
international tax arena offers an array of organizations whose 
contributions must be assessed. These organizations include 
BIAC, the Center for Freedom and Prosperity (“CFP”),51 EATPL, 
IBFD, ICC, IFA, ITD, International Tax Planning Association 
(“ITPA”),52 Joint International Tax Shelter Information Centre 
(“JITSIC”),53 Seven Country Working Group on Tax Havens,54 
Tax Executives Institute (“TEI”),55 Taxpayers Association of 
Europe,56 United States Council for International Business,57 and 
World Taxpayers Associations.58 
Not surprisingly, these non-state-based organizations can be 
grouped according to several different themes. Some of the 
nonstate organizations might be best characterized as bodies 
seeking to promote learning, analysis, and research in taxation. 
Candidates for this label include IFA, EATLP, and IBFD. Despite 
their “common” missions, their membership is not uniform. IFA, 
for example, has a very broad, global membership of tax lawyers, 
 
50. See supra note 34. 
51. See generally CFP Mission Statement, http://www.freedomandprosperity.org/
Mission/mission.shtml (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
52. See generally A Brief History of the ITPA and Why You Should Join, 
http://www.itpa.org/history.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
53. See generally IRS News Release IR-2004-61 (May 3, 2004). 
54. See generally ERNST & YOUNG, TAX ADMINISTRATION GOES GLOBAL: COMPLEXITY 
, RISKS, OPPORTUNITIES 4 (2007), reprinted in 114 TAX NOTES 847 (2007). 
55. See generally About TEI, http://www.tei.org/topnav/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
56. See generally Profile of the TAE, http://english.taxpayers-europe.com/aboutus/
profile.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
57. See generally USCIB at a Glance, http://www.uscib.org/
index.asp?documentid=2410 (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
58. See generally World Taxpayers Associations Purpose, 
http://www.worldtaxpayers.org/purpose.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
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scholars, and accountants.59 In contrast, EATLP limits 
membership to tax professors in the EU, though associate status 
is available for certain other tax professors.60 The IBFD is a 
nonprofit tax documentation and research organization overseen 
by a board of trustees comprised of approximately fifteen tax 
professionals and academics from around the world.61 
Organizations structured around businesses and commercial 
goals are another subset of nonstate organizations. BIAC, for 
example, which was founded in 1962 as an independent 
organization, is “[o]fficially recognised . . . as being 
representative of the OECD business community.”62 BIAC’s 
members are multinational businesses from the OECD’s member 
countries.63 Similarly, the ICC has thousands of multinational 
business members worldwide that use the ICC to influence 
“governments and intergovernmental organizations, whose 
decisions affect corporate finances and operations worldwide.”64 
Another category of organizations shares the business 
community’s concern about levels of taxation, but is more 
explicitly focused on advocating for low taxes and no income 
taxes. The World Taxpayers Associations, whose members are 
themselves local taxpayers organizations, is such a body.65 
Similarly, the ITPA, whose mission is to explore tax issues from 
the taxpayers’ perspective,66 devotes its resources to 
disseminating cross-border tax planning advice to its tightly 
controlled membership.67 The CFP, which is a U.S. tax-exempt 
 
59. See What Is IFA?, supra note 22 (self-describing its membership as consisting of 
12,000 members from over 100 countries). 
60. See European Ass’n of Tax Law Professors [EATLP], Articles of Association 
EATLP arts. 5–7, available at http://www.eatlp.org/constitution_of_EATLP.html 
[hereinafter EATLP Articles of Association]. 
61. See IBFD Board of Trustees, http://www.ibfd.org/portal/BoardofTrustees.htm 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
62. About BIAC, http://www.biac.org/aboutus.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
63. See BIAC Membership, http://www.biac.org/members.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 
2010) (listing a variety of multinational business members). 
64. Links to ICC Member Companies, http://www.iccwbo.org/id19696/index.html 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
65. See World Taxpayers Associations: Member Associations, 
http://www.worldtaxpayers.org/members.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
66. See A Brief History of the ITPA and Why You Should Join, supra note 52. (“We 
examine our subject mostly from the point of view of the taxpayer; membership is 
limited to practitioners who act for or in the interests of taxpayers.”). 
67. See id. (noting that “[t]he object of our Association is to disseminate and 
exchange information about international tax planning” but that membership may be 
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entity that was founded by a U.S. economist and a former Capitol 
Hill staffer,68 challenges the OECD’s efforts to curb certain types 
of tax competition as well as the Financial Action Task Force’s 
(“FATF”)69 efforts to curb money laundering.70 It instead 
encourages jurisdictions to keep taxes low and to resist FATF 
banking and financial controls.71 
Finally, multinational businesses themselves fall within the 
category of nonstate international organizations. The case study 
in Part III.A.1 explores some avenues by which multinational 
enterprises exert influence; here, it suffices to note that these 
enterprises play important roles both as organizations themselves 
and as members of other organizations. While financial resources 
are not the sole measure of influence, one concrete way in which 
to capture this potential muscle is through comparisons of 
revenue and gross national product (“GNP”). A 2001 discussion 
observed that “[t]he 50 largest transnational industrial 
companies have annual sales revenue greater than the GNP of 
132 members of the United Nations.”72 Even if multinational 
businesses themselves can constitute international organizations, 
is it worthwhile to inquire about their “membership”? Regardless 
of whether membership is defined as representing (1) owners; 
 
revoked or denied “without being required to disclose any reason”). Until August 2008, 
prospective members were required to aver that “My work is concerned with or includes 
the theory or practice of international tax planning or the study thereof but is not 
concerned with and does not include in the normal course (whether or not as the employee of any 
government) levying taxes of any kind in any part of the world (Rule 4(1) of the Association). I 
understand that the Committee has the power to grant or refuse this application without 
being required to disclose any reason.” Int’l Tax Planning Assoc., ITPA Membership 
Application Form (June 30, 2008) (emphasis added), available at http://new.itpa.org/
 memform.html. 
68. See CF&P At-a-Glance, http://freedomandprosperity.org/Glance/glance.shtml 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
69. The Group of Seven (“G7”) countries created the Financial Action Task Force 
(“FATF”) as an intergovernmental body in 1989 to address the threat that international 
money laundering posed to the global banking and financial systems. Under its current 
mandate, the FATF responds to threats from money laundering and terrorism 
financing. See About the Financial Action Task Force, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/
0,3417,en_32250379_32236836_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
70. See CF&P At-a-Glance, supra note 68. The source of funding for the Center for 
Freedom and Prosperity (“CFP”) is unknown, although financial services firms (who 
stand to potentially benefit from the existence of tax havens) have reportedly been 
among its contributors. See Thomas F. Field, Tax Competition in Europe and America, 29 
TAX NOTES INT'L 1235, 1242 (2003). 
71. See CF&P At-a-Glance, supra note 68. 
72. Willetts, supra note 18, at 360. 
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(2) owners and management; or (3) owners, management, and 
workers,73 the membership, on balance, would be strongly 
attentive to producing the largest profit possible for that specific 
organization, which would then be divided among its 
constituents.74 
The preceding examination of international tax 
organizations’ membership criteria reveals how groups can 
structure membership around shared geography, mission, or 
identity. It also foreshadows some of the observations based on 
variability in size and composition considered below in Part 
II.B.2.d. 
b. Organizational Structure 
Closely linked to the question of membership is the choice 
of organizational structure, which can range from informal and 
essentially “network-like” to highly formal. Not surprisingly, some 
of the larger state-based organizations exhibit a highly formal 
structure. For example, the U.N. operates under a charter that 
 
73. Characterizing owners, management, and workers together as the “members” 
represented by the firm is one way of conceptualizing the firm as a collection of 
interests. One could also argue that membership of these organizations should reflect 
only the interests of their owners, or perhaps owners and managers. But including 
workers as members is valuable, since workers will generally prefer that their 
corporations have more disposable after-tax income. That said, there are various 
important fissures in the bonds between workers and the owners and managers, and 
these fissures may emerge in some international decision-making contexts. For example, 
a determination to relocate a portion of domestic jobs overseas may suit owners and 
managers, but not their employees. 
74. Although modern visions of corporations and corporate responsibility may 
promote a broader vision of social responsibility, that is not the standard operating 
framework today for most multinational business decisions. See, e.g., Joseph William 
Singer, Corporate Responsibility in a Free and Democratic Society, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
1031, 1034 (2008); Robert B. Reich, The Case Against Corporate Social Responsibility (Univ. 
of Cal., Berkeley, Goldman School Sch. of Public Pub. Pol’y Working Paper GSPP 08-
003, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1213129. 
As academics begin to focus more attention on multinational entities as 
international organizations, it will be interesting to explore how their decision-making 
reveals the “real” membership. Who is in mind when decisions are made? Current 
owners? Current workers? Some subset of workers? This question may become more 
revealing as countries demand that changes in business form be accompanied by real, 
on-the-ground consequences in order to trigger tax effects. Thus, for example, a 
decision to restructure a business and remove certain functions from a tax jurisdiction 
(with the expectation of lower source country tax in the new jurisdiction) could not be 
accomplished by paper only; it would also require real and meaningful changes 
(typically reductions) in worker functions and risks undertaken in the original country. 
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specifies its member states’ rights and sets out the U.N. organs 
and procedures that will enable execution of the U.N.’s 
mission.75 Currently there are six major organs: (1) the General 
Assembly; (2) the Security Council; (3) the Economic and Social 
Council; (4) the Trusteeship Council; (5) the International 
Court of Justice; and (6) the Secretariat.76 In addition to these 
groups, there are fifteen agencies, and a host of subsidiary 
programmes and bodies.77 Some of the programs are subsidiaries 
of the General Assembly, while others have special agreements 
with and report to one of the six bodies. The structure is highly 
complicated but also explained in great detail in the U.N. 
Charter.78 When analyzing the U.N. as a player in international 
 
75. See generally HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS OF ITS FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS (1950) (providing a detailed legal analysis of 
the U.N. Charter and organization). 
76. U.N. Charter art. 7, para. 1. 
77. See U.N. Structure and Organization, http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/
structure/index.shtml (last visited Apr. 3, 2010) (listing the various subdivisions). For a 
graphical representation of the entities comprising the United Nations, see U.N. Dep’t 
of Pub. Info., The United Nations System: Principle Organs, U.N.Doc.DPI/2470 (Dec. 2007), 
available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/chart_en.pdf [hereinafter U.N. Organizational 
Chart]. 
78. See U.N. Charter arts. 9–101; see also U.N. Organizational Chart, supra note 77. 
Note that formality is not inherently linked with state-based membership. Many 
multinational organizations are very formally organized. The International Fiscal 
Association (“IFA”), for instance, is made up of Central IFA, which is composed of an 
Executive Committee, Permanent Scientific Committee, and General Council, Int’l 
Fiscal Assoc. [IFA], Articles of Association arts. 5, 13, http://www.ifa.nl/organisation/
central_ifa/articles_of_association/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2010) [hereinafter IFA Articles of 
Association]; see also Central IFA, http://www.ifa.nl/organisation/central_ifa/pages (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2010) (supplying information on each of the three Central IFA 
committees), and sixty branch offices worldwide, IFA Articles of Association art. 7; see also 
Branches—IFA, http://www.ifa.nl/branches/pages/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 3, 
2010) (displaying branch offices graphically and in list form). Central IFA is charged 
through its several bodies with the tasks of day-to-day management of the association 
(Executive Committee), IFA Articles of Association, supra, art. 12.1, planning and 
implementing scientific work (Permanent Scientific Committee), id. art. 13.1, and long-
term/strategic management (General Council), id. art. 11.1. Each of Central IFA’s three 
bodies has its own leadership structure, beginning with a General Council whose 
members are appointed by the General Assembly (composed of all IFA members) on 
the basis of nominations by the branch offices. See id. art. 11.6. The General Council 
then appoints the members of the Executive Committee and Permanent Scientific 
Committee, and selected leadership therein. See id. art. 11.4. The President is appointed 
by the General Assembly for a two–year term. See id. arts. 10.6, 15.1. IFA is dedicated to 
the study of international and comparative law in the areas of finance and taxation. See 
What Is IFA?, supra note 22. It pursues its aims through annual meetings on topics 
chosen by the Permanent Scientific Committee and held at one of the branches. See id. 
IFA also puts forth scientific research and publications to support its views and allows 
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relations, it is important to specify where in its organizational 
structure the power, influence, decision making, and budgeting 
for the particular issue rests. For example, the Security Council 
has fifteen members, five of whom are permanent members, and 
ten of whom are elected by the General Assembly for two-year 
terms.79 Issues impacting security questions cannot be envisioned 
as a vote among the majority of U.N. members, but rather as 
questions on which a few nations have notable influence.80 
In contrast to the U.N. and other formally structured 
organizations (such as, the OECD or multinational enterprises), 
some organizations exhibit much less formality. For example, the 
Seven Country Working Group on Tax Havens, which consists of 
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States, serves as a forum in which member states 
can exchange and develop strategies for combating tax evasion 
and tax competition.81 In this forum, “[m]embers bilaterally 
exchange information at a [taxpayer and tax shelter] promoter 
level, share research and information on transactions 
encountered and strategies adopted, and conduct joint training 
sessions.”82 Although the details regarding the precise 
 
members access to its databank. See IFA Membership, http://www.ifa.nl/organisation/
membership/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
79. U.N. Charter art. 23, para. 1–2. 
80. Resolutions brought before the Security Council will fail if any permanent 
member casts a negative vote. See U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3. But even possession of 
veto power is not absolute, because any permanent member may choose to withhold 
their veto power for political reasons. See Thomas Buha, Security Council, in 2 UNITED 
NATIONS: LAW, POLICIES AND PRACTICE 1147, 1156–57 (Rudiger Wolfrum ed., 1995) 
(describing the permanent member veto power as a form of “political 
protectionalism”); see also David M. Malone, Security Council, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF THE UNITED NATIONS 117, 120 (Thomas G. Weiss & Sam Daws eds., 2007) 
(remarking on the historic stalemate has occurred as a result of the veto power). 
81. See ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 54, at 4. Common problems tackled by the 
members include “e-commerce, the internet and credit or debit cards in abusive tax 
haven arrangements, intangibles, offshore banking and brokerage, [and promoters of 
tax haven arrangements].” Australian Taxation Office, supra note 48. 
82. ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 54, at 4. The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), for 
example, explicitly references its work with international bodies, including the Seven 
Country Working Group. IRS, LARGE AND MIDSIZE BUSINESS SUBGROUP REPORT, 8 
TaxCore (BNA) No. 224 (Nov. 20, 2008) (“Currently, . . . representatives engage with 
many multi-national collaborative tax administration groups in order to exchange ideas, 
and to expand their understanding of the various innovative programs. Examples of 
such groups include: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s 
(OECD) – Forum on Tax Administration’s Large Business Task Group; Seven Country 
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organizational structure of the Seven Country Working Group 
are not published, the available information paints a picture of 
an informal, nonhierarchical arrangement.83 The nature of the 
group’s goals can be characterized as advisory, informative, and 
enforcement-oriented at most. JITSIC, another small, state-based 
organization, was established by a consortium of countries in 
2004 under a multilateral agreement to assist in responding to 
tax avoidance and tax shelters.84 The relatively brief four-page 
memorandum of understanding identifies “information 
exchange” as the core function of the group in order to share 
best practices and enhance enforcement efforts against abusive 
tax schemes.85 In order to achieve these ambitions, meetings are 
to be held “periodically.”86 The document also specifies that an 
executive steering group will coordinate and oversee JITSIC’s 
work.87 Although it is possible to imagine a more detailed and 
formal organizational document accompanying the mission of 
these organizations, it is not clear what such a structure would 
add.88 Moreover, it is possible that some of the organization’s 
 
Tax Haven Working Group (7C); the Tax Administration for Large Companies (TALC) 
research group; and the Joint International Tax Shelter Information Centre (JITSIC).”). 
83. See, e.g., ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 54, at 4 (qualifying that “it is difficult to 
know exactly what information governments are exchanging and what actions have been 
taken as a direct consequence”); Peter Menyasz, Canada Volunteers for Global Forum’s Tax 
Information Exchange Peer Review, 5 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) I-2 (Jan. 11, 2001) (reporting 
on a series of “high-level working sessions” with tax administration counterparts from 
the various working group states); David D. Stewart, Canadian UBS Clients Disclose 
Millions in Unreported Income, 57 TAX NOTES INT’L 128, 128 (2008) (quoting Canadian 
Revenue Minister Jean-Pierre Blackburn as describing the group as a series of 
impromptu meetings where information is exchanged between tax officials); Australian 
Taxation Office, supra note 49 (indicating only that members states “bilaterally 
exchange information” and “issue international tax alerts”). 
84. See Memorandum of Understanding for the Creation of a Joint International 
Tax Shelter Information Centre, Apr. 23, 2004, 2004 WL 1080239. A copy of the 
agreement is electronically available on the IRS website at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
utl/jitsic-finalmou.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). The signatories to the agreement are 
Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. See Memorandum of 
Understanding for the Creation of a Joint International Tax Shelter Information 
Centre, supra. 
85. See Memorandum of Understanding for the Creation of a Joint International 
Tax Shelter Information Centre, supra note 84. For more information on the intended 
work of JITSIC, see Press Release, supra note 53. 
86. See Memorandum of Understanding for the Creation of a Joint International 
Tax Shelter Information Centre, supra note 84. 
87. See id. 
88. Incidentally, the United States is party to several income tax treaties with each 
of the countries that are members of JITSIC and the Seven Country Working Group, 
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flexibility could be lost if these interactions were more formally 
constituted and potentially subject to other approval processes.89 
On the other hand, this degree of informality may limit the 
group’s ability to advocate a unified position on particular 
questions or to lobby other organizations in furtherance of that 
agenda. Case study examination of how such an informally 
constituted group generates influence beyond its membership 
should provide some insight. 
c. Agenda Setting 
Perhaps the most crucial element of control over an 
organization is agenda setting. Regardless of how much power, 
influence, control, or persuasion an international organization 
possesses, the true impact of these forces is only experienced if 
and when the organization takes a particular position on an 
issue. Thus, the ability to affect the agenda of an international 
organization is critical, and the relevant input and impact may 
come from sources both internal and external to the 
organization. In fact, one can envision agenda setting as a 
 
which could provide a formal basis for implementing their cooperation. See, e.g., 
Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of Japan For the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of 
Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Japan, Nov. 6, 2003, S. TREATY 
DOC. NO. 108-14; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention 
of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital Gains, U.S.-U.K., July 
24, 2001, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 107–19 (2002); Convention Between the Government of 
the United States of America and the Government of the French Republic for the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to 
Taxes on Income and Capital, U.S.-Fr., Aug. 31, 1994, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-32; 
Convention Between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany 
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect 
to Taxes on Income and Capital and to Certain Other Taxes, U.S.-F.R.G., Aug. 29, 1989, 
S. TREATY DOC. NO. 101-10; Convention Between the United States of America and 
Australia for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion 
with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Austl., Aug. 6, 1982, 35 U.S.T. 1999; Convention 
Between the United States of America and Canada with Respect to Taxes on Income and 
on Capital, U.S.-Can., Sept. 26, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,087. 
89. See, e.g., Arthur Cockfield, A Law and Technology Perspective on Enhanced 
Cross-Border Tax Information Exchange 20 (Nov. 28, 2007) (unpublished manuscript 
on file with the author and available at http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/files/
cockfield_toronto.pdf) (observing that “Canada and other countries are increasingly 
turning to informal multilateral agreements sponsored by groups such as the Joint 
International Tax Shelter Information Centre, the Pacific Association of Tax 
Administrators and the Seven Country Working Group on Tax Havens to share tax and 
financial information without these agreements being vetted by legislative bodies”). 
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cascading and interconnected process whereby some players, 
including international organizations, determine a desirable 
agenda and then seek to encourage others to pursue the 
identified path. Agenda setting may be determined through 
either the formal structure of an organization (members and 
sometimes nonmembers may be able to petition the organization 
to address a particular question) or informal mechanisms 
(members and nonmembers have the opportunity to influence 
the agenda setting body). 
TEI is one of the international tax organizations that 
consciously articulates the importance of participating in agenda 
setting. Founded in 1944, its membership includes “accountants, 
lawyers, and other corporate and business employees who are 
responsible for the tax affairs of their employers in an executive, 
administrative, or managerial capacity.”90 TEI’s established 
mission is to “enhance and improve the tax system and to serve 
its members, their employers, and society . . . by effectively 
advocating its members’ views, and by promoting competence 
and professionalism in both the private and government 
sectors.”91 The advocacy section of TEI’s website outlines ten ways 
to become involved in the organization’s advocacy activities 
including: (1) joining a TEI committee, (2) volunteering to work 
on a specific project, (3) posting an issue on the specified web 
page, (4) faxing an issue directly to TEI staff, and (5) calling or 
emailing TEI’s committee chairs or staff.92 The entire sixteen 
page TEI Membership and Advocacy Guide places significant 
emphasis on the advocacy role of the organization.93 Thus, TEI is 
signaling the importance of its agenda and its members’ 
participation in creating and executing that agenda. The explicit 
invitation to participate in setting the agenda does not guarantee 
that members perceive the process as one that truly fosters an 
 
90. TEI Benefits, http://www.tei.org/membership/pages/benefits.aspx (last visited 
Apr. 3, 2010). Additional membership eligibility requirements apply. Members must 
have at least five years of corporate tax-related experience. See TEI Eligibility, 
http://www.tei.org/membership/pages/eligibility.aspx (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). Public 
tax practitioners or other consultants are ineligible for membership. See id. 
91. About TEI, available at http://www.tei.org/topnav/pages/about_tei.aspx (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
92. Tax Executives Institute [TEI], TEI’s Membership and Advocacy Guide (n.d.), 
available at http://www.tei.org/membership/documents/tei_memberbro_web.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 21, 2010). 
93. Id. 
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open agenda. However, TEI’s public and straightforward 
encouragement of active and direct member participation would 
certainly raise the expectations of members and generate 
negative feedback to the organization if such opportunities for 
agenda setting proved illusory. 
The U.N.’s tax policy body, the Committee of Experts on 
International Cooperation in Tax Matters, also exemplifies a 
more formal process. This body was established by resolution of 
the Economic and Social Council (“ECOSOC”), one of the 
U.N.’s six major organs.94 The Committee includes twenty-five tax 
administrators coming from each of ten developed countries and 
fifteen developing countries.95 These experts are nominated by 
their governments, but act “in their expert capacity.”96 The 
Secretary-General appoints the twenty-five members for four-year 
terms, taking into account the organization’s needs for tax 
policy, tax administration, geographic distribution, and 
representation of different types of tax systems.97 The Committee 
now meets for five days annually.98 According to its ECOSOC 
mandate, the Committee is responsible for maintaining and 
updating the U.N. Model Treaty, “provid[ing] a framework for 
dialogue” for national tax administrations, and making 
recommendations to assist developing economies.99 Thus, the 
basic contours of the Committee’s agenda are established by 
resolution. 
The Committee’s report from its 2008 session100 provides 
additional insight into the operational dimensions of its agenda 
 
94. See ECOSOC Res. 2004/69, U.N. Doc. E/RES/2004/69 (Nov. 11, 2004). This 
committee was originally created as the Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Tax Treaties 
Between Developed and Developing Countries by resolution in 1967. See ECOSOC Res. 
1273 (XLII), U.N. Doc. E/4429, at 5 (Aug. 4, 1967). That body was reconstituted as the 
Ad Hoc Group of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters by subsequent 
resolution in 1980. See ECOSOC Res. 1980/13, U.N. Doc. E/RES/1980/13 (Apr. 28, 
1980). 
95. See ECOSOC Res. 2004/69, supra note 94, para. (b) (outlining structure of the 
committee); see also The Secretary-General, Appointment of 25 Members of the Committee of 
Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters, U.N. Doc. E/2009/9/Add.17 (Apr. 22, 
2009) (appointing new membership and listing country of origin). 
96. ECOSOC Res. 2004/69, supra note 94, para. (b). 
97. See id. 
98. See Mandate of the Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax 
Matters, http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/mandate.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
99. ECOSOC Res. 2004/69, supra note 94, para. (d)(ii). 
100. See ECOSOC, supra note 43. 
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process. As an initial matter, the proposed agenda was adopted 
by consensus,101 but it was the product of interactions prior to the 
2008 session.102 Subcommittees or working groups researched 
and analyzed many of these items, and then presented their 
detailed work to the Committee for consideration.103 Following 
the presentations at the 2008 session, the subcommittees and 
working groups were given further directions and mandates.104 
The first topic, which emerged from preparations for the 
upcoming Doha Conference on financing for development, 
addressed whether the Expert Committee should be transformed 
from its expert, nongovernmental structure to an 
intergovernmental commission.105 Reconfiguring the body to an 
intergovernmental commission would enable its work to “carry 
greater weight” as a result of its members’ political influence.106 
Given the increased attention to both the global financial system 
and the need for international tax cooperation, the U.N. was 
considering “the future of the Committee and its possibilities as 
the only truly global forum in this area.”107 Some experts on the 
Committee expressed reservations and viewed additional 
information as essential to passing on the composition and 
operation of the proposal.108 They also voiced apprehension that 
the proposed shift in the body would undesirably politicize issues 
and reduce success on more technical matters.109 It was 
recognized, however, that the decision to ultimately implement 
this change would rest in the hands of U.N. member states, not 
 
101. See id. ¶ 8. 
102. See, e.g., ECOSOC, Comm. of Experts on Int’l Cooperation on Tax Matters, 
Report on the Third Session (29 October–2 November 2007), ¶ 78, U.N. Doc. E/2007/45, 
E/C.18/2007/19 (Jan. 15, 2008) (adopting a draft agenda for the Committee’s next 
session). 
103. See ECOSOC, supra note 43, ¶¶ 21, 28, 40, 52, 56, 61, 70, 76. 
104. Id. ¶¶ 25, 31, 59. 61, 75. But see id. ¶ 51, 78 (thanking a subcommittee for 
successfully carrying out the objective of its mandate). For an example of a report 
prepared by a subcommittee for consideration during the 2008 session, see, for 
example, ECOSOC, Comm. of Experts on Int’l Cooperation on Tax Matters, Subcomm. 
on Improper Use of Treaties, Proposed Amendments, U.N. Doc. E/C.18/2008/CRP.2 (Oct. 
17, 2008) 
105. See ECOSOC, supra note 43, ¶ 11. 
106. See id. 
107. See id. 
108. See id. ¶ 17. 
109. See id. 
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the Committee.110 The Committee then proceeded to discuss the 
other items on the agenda in turn.111 As for attendance, 108 
observers attended in addition to the twenty-two (of twenty-five) 
Committee members that participated.112 Forty-eight came from 
U.N. countries without an expert on the Committee, one from 
the Isle of Man, and one from the Holy See.113 Additional 
observers came from five intergovernmental organizations.114 
Lastly, seventeen persons attended the session in their individual 
capacity.115 
This brief overview of the U.N. tax policy committee does 
not provide exhaustive guidance on the question of agenda 
setting for the U.N. It does, however, begin to describe the basic 
formal framework and the informal opportunities for agenda 
setting. On the formal side, the Committee receives its mandates, 
develops responsibilities and tasks for its subcommittees, 
considers work reported back from those subcommittees, and 
then ultimately presents its views to the ECOSOC thereby moving 
specific tax items onto their agenda.116 On the informal side, the 
acknowledged presence of observers indicates the existence of a 
discernable mechanism for nonmembers, who by definition 
cannot affect outcome through a vote, to offer their views. 
Moreover, these nonmembers have the potential to interact with 
each other and coordinate their comments at the very moment 
when members are beginning to make decisions. 
One caution must be noted: the mere presence of 
nonmembers does not guarantee their ability to influence debate 
and outcome, even when their presence is regular or 
institutionalized. It is certainly possible that this type of openness 
may constitute nothing more than window dressing. That said, it 
seems much more plausible to anticipate that a decision to 
 
110. See id. ¶ 15. 
111. See ¶¶ 21–78 (considering items such as revising the model treaty 
commentaries, defining “permanent establishment,” exchanging information, and 
addressing dispute resolution). 
112. Id. at ¶ 2. 
113. Id. at ¶ 3. 
114. See id. at ¶¶ 4–5 (including the European Commission, the International 
Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (“IBFD”), International Chamber of Commerce 
(“ICC”), OECD, and the Tax Justice Network). 
115. Id. at ¶ 5. 
116. See Mandate of the Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in 
Tax Matters, supra note 98. 
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permit observers itself indicates some expectation for 
contribution. Furthermore, even if some U.N. members accepted 
observers’ presence on the assumption that their involvement 
would only be cosmetic, the observers’ proximity to decision 
making and their opportunity to connect with other observers 
could make their presence more substantive. 
An interesting question for empirical investigation is where 
and how observers realistically contribute. The admission of 
outside observers could range from silent presence in the back of 
the room, to the opportunity to debate and present arguments 
on par with members, stopping just short of the voting process. 
Does access enable these nonmembers to participate in shaping 
action on issues, or even setting the organization’s agenda? Of 
course, even this dichotomy may prove too stylized. Agenda 
setting itself is likely to be the product of multiple avenues of 
influence and communication with organizational leadership. In 
some cases, new issues may be identified as obvious and critical 
topics for the organization. In others, new agenda issues may 
emerge through the process of responding to current agenda 
items. It is at least plausible to imagine that parties permitted to 
actively engage in discussion could shape the future agenda by 
raising problems and questions in the course of debate. 
d. Output 
How does an organization commemorate and capture its 
decision-making and planning process? How does it envision its 
end product? The answers to these questions vary across 
international organizations. For example, multinational 
businesses and international organizations attentive to member 
profit (such as the ICC) might pursue any number of output 
strategies, including: (1) conducting or funding studies that 
support a particular conclusion or approach; (2) developing 
talking points and position statements for lobbying states and 
state-based international organizations; and (3) creating informal 
or formal alliances with other organizations that share a similar 
disposition on the particular issue. 
State-based organizations with targeted agendas (such as 
PATA) may find that their ultimate goal is to develop 
administrative practices for their members on identified issues; 
this may or may not require producing guidelines for their 
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members or for taxpayers.117 In some cases, the nature of the 
work may not lend itself to publication outside of the group. 
Consider, for example, JITSIC, which provides limited details on 
its current targets of inquiry, and on how it obtains and 
disseminates information.118 JITSIC does, however, publish 
information on new tax shelters and abusive transactions once 
they have been formally targeted.119 
Larger state-based international organizations with broad 
agendas and membership (such as the U.N. or OECD) may find 
that formalizing agreement on issues by way of guidelines, model 
rules, or model treaties is vital to ensuring that the value of any 
agreement process is preserved and maximized. Of course, these 
types of organizations perform a wide range of functions that do 
not explicitly require support nor affirmation of the general 
membership, including conducting studies and issuing member 
reviews.120 Moreover, as any organization expands or shifts its 
focus, new forms of output can emerge. The trajectory of the 
OECD’s interaction with nonmembers over the past two decades 
reflects this potential for output shift. The OECD’s growing 
number of tax programs for nonmembers, often conducted on a 
regional basis, corresponds to its increasing interest in cultivating 
and expanding connections with nonmembers.121 For example, 
 
117. See, e.g., Pacific Association of Tax Administrators, MAP Operation Guidance 
for Member Countries of the Pacific Association of Tax Administrators (PATA), 
http://www.nta.go.jp/foreign_language/pata2004/02.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2010) 
(prescribing mutual agreement procedures for transfer pricing disputes involving PATA 
member nations). 
118. See, e.g., TEI-LSMB Liaison Meeting, TAX EXECUTIVE, Feb. 12, 2009, at 3 
(reporting on a new initiative “to develop a multi-year proposal to expand JITSIC’s 
traditional role of fighting tax shelters,” but questioning, “what are the areas of 
expanded inquiry under considerations?”). 
119. See, e.g., Lisa M. Nadal, JITSIC Puts U.S. Antiabuse Effort on Fast Track, Former 
Director Says, 52 TAX NOTES INT’L 294, 295 (2008). 
120. See What We Do and How, http://www.oecd.org/ (follow “About OECD” 
hyperlink; then follow “What We Do and How” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 3, 2010) 
(describing the OECD’s responsibilities, which include “data collection” and “analysis” 
at the most basic levels); see also U.N. Charter art. 13 (mentioning its obligation to 
perform studies); G.A. Res. 60/251, ¶ 5(3), U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/251 (Apr. 3, 2006) 
(providing that member states are subject to review for adherence to human rights 
obligations). 
121. See OECD, Members and Partners, supra note 42 (describing OECD’s 
commitment to global relations with non-members, generally); see also Participating in the 
Global Relations Tax Programme 1 (n.d.), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/62/44459895.pdf (advertising that “[c]loser 
engagement with non-OECD economies is essential” for purposes of tax policy). 
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in June 2000, the OECD held its first significant symposium on 
harmful tax competition that included representatives from 
twenty-nine nonmember countries.122 In commenting on the 
event, OECD Deputy Secretary-General Seiichi Kondo observed, 
“This is historic. The OECD was once criticized as a rich man’s 
club, but this cooperation shows that it is not so.”123 In December 
2006, the OECD announced that it was organizing an “informal 
consultative group of government and private sector 
representatives, under the auspices of the Centre for Tax Policy 
and Administration” to address questions regarding cross-border 
portfolio investments through collective investment vehicles.124 
The OECD indicated that the group would seek input from both 
member and nonmember countries, and anticipated “securing 
nonmember representation.”125 The group meets periodically 
and prepares reports for the Centre for Tax Policy. Its 2009 
report included among the group members two representatives 
from China, three from the BIAC, and twenty-five from the 
private sector.126 
Organizations oriented toward developing and studying tax 
issues (such as IFA127 and the EATLP) often participate in 
 
122. See OECD, The OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax Practices: The 2001 Progress Report 
(2001), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/5/2664450.pdf. 
123. Robert Goulder, OECD Tax Symposium Looks to Outside Governments for New Era 
of International Cooperation, 21 TAX NOTES INT’L 91, 91 (2000) (quoting OECD Deputy 
Secretary-General Seiichi Kondo). 
124. Kevin A. Bell, OECD Officials Discuss Tax Treaty Projects, 52 TAX NOTES INT’L 
32, 33 (2007). 
125. Id. 
126. OECD, REPORT OF THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON THE TAXATION 
OF COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT VEHICLES AND PROCEDURES FOR TAX RELIEF FOR CROSS-
BORDER INVESTORS ON POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS TO PROCEDURES FOR TAX RELIEF FOR 
CROSS-BORDER INVESTORS (2009), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/26/
41974553.pdf. 
127. One could argue that the practicing tax lawyers and accountants among the 
IFA members are more akin to the ICC because they approach international tax issues 
from their client base’s perspective, and hence function as a proxy for their clients’ 
views. Although there is certainly some validity to this observation, it overstates the 
similarity between a multinational business itself (or a trade- or business-based 
association, such as the ICC) and bodies such as the IFA. First, lawyers and accountants 
have multiple clients whose interests may not all coincide. Second, they have 
professional identities distinct from their agency role in representing clients and often 
participate in teaching and writing beyond their clients’ basic goals. Third, practicing 
lawyers and accountants are not IFA’s exclusive members, as academics also participate. 
IFA’s Permanent Scientific Committee, which is charged with “planning and 
implementation of the scientific work of the Association,” has an academic vice chair, 
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research and report writing projects, and sponsor regular 
conferences. The expectation is that the organization can help 
examine issues that will be foundational to policy decision-
making. IFA identifies its objectives as “the study and 
advancement of international and comparative law in regard to 
public finance, specifically international and comparative fiscal 
law and the financial and economic aspects of taxation.”128 IFA 
achieves these goals through its annual IFA congress, during 
which major IFA research, other secondary topics, and 
corresponding “scientific” publications are presented and 
discussed. In preparation for each annual congress, IFA identifies 
two important topics that will be the foundation of the two 
signature reports for the year.129 A general reporter is selected for 
each topic, and then national reporters are also chosen. 
Together, the general and national reporters devise an analytical 
framework for the topic, and each national reporter prepares a 
report from the perspective of the national reporter’s own 
country’s domestic tax law. The general reporter then prepares 
an overview report based on the work of the national reporters. 
IFA publishes a volume containing the general and national 
reports for both topics.130 
Research also dominates the EATLP’s agenda. According to 
EATLP’s constitution, its objectives are “to contribute to the 
development of European tax law and to the development of 
academic teaching and research programmes on European, 
international, domestic and comparative taxation.”131 To this 
end, the EATLP 
organiz[es] annual congresses and other meetings; carr[ies] 
out research projects; assist[s] members in developing 
undergraduate and post graduate tax curricula at 
Universities throughout Europe; present[s] the opinion of 
 
and ten of the twenty-two members of the committee are academics. International Fiscal 
Association [IFA], Permanent Scientific Committee, http://www.ifa.nl/organisation/
central_ifa/permanent_scientific_committee/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
128. IFA, What is IFA?, supra note 22. 
129. See IFA Annual Congress, http://www.ifa.nl/activities/annual_congresses/ 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2010); IFA, What is IFA?, supra note 22 (“Although the operations of 
the IFA are essentially scientific in character, the subjects selected take account of 
current fiscal developments and changes in local legislation.”). 
130. See Cashiers de Droit Fiscal, http://www.ifa.nl/publications/cahiers/ (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2010) (listing the publications from each congress dating back to 1939). 
131. EATLP Articles of Association, supra note 60, art. 2.1. 
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the Association to institutions of the European Union and 
parliaments, governments and tax authorities of European 
countries; support[s] exchange programmes for professors 
and students of tax law; and all other means conducive to its 
objects.132 
If IFA and EATLP successfully create or enhance shared 
language, policy expectations, and analytical frameworks they can 
affect the dialogue, decision making, and agreement process. 
The precise nature of this impact partially depends on whether 
the organization’s influence is best characterized as a shared 
educational platform, the influence of experts, or network 
effects; in some cases, the organization’s influence may be 
captured by all three concepts.133 
3. Summary 
Evaluating these four major components that underlie 
international organizations—membership, organizational 
structure, agenda setting, and output—should form the basis of 
any inquiry into the development of international tax policy. As 
demonstrated above, these factors significantly impact an 
organization’s actions. And not only is each factor individually 
influential, but certain combinations, such as organizational 
structure and agenda setting, can generate predictable outcomes. 
For example, consider the treatment of tax policy in the EU. 
Because matters of direct taxation in the EU require a 
unanimous vote of the EU member states,134 actors able to 
influence the EU agenda may “self censor” and withhold agenda 
items unlikely to be successfully adopted (e.g., rate 
harmonization) because proposing these agenda items would 
waste time and political capital.135 Ultimately, the organizational 
 
132. Id. art. 3. 
133. See, e.g., Peter M. Haas, Introduction to KNOWLEDGE, POWER, AND 
INTERNATIONAL POLICY 1, 3 (Peter M. Haas ed., 1992). 
134. Although the EU increasingly relies on qualified majority voting (“QMV”) for 
more issues, many questions still require a unanimous vote, including foreign policy, 
defense, EU membership applications, election rules, and taxation. See, e.g., WILLIAM 
NICOLL & TREVOR C. SALMON, UNDERSTANDING THE EUROPEAN UNION 555–56 (2001); 
The Council of the European Union, http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/council/ (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2010) (noting that unanimous voting is retained for “sensitive areas”). 
135. It is certainly possible that some actors may have a different definition of 
success, perhaps because they adopt a longer time horizon, view a matter as leverage on 
another issue, or use the EU stage to frame the issue for another forum. That said, 
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structure, by requiring unanimous voting, constrains the issues 
that appear on the EU agenda. 
C. A Dynamic Understanding of International Relations in Tax Policy 
1. Sophisticated Scrutiny 
Despite the importance of the four factors in defining the 
contours of an international organization, they only begin to 
capture how an organization participates in the policy formation 
process. Different actors, including states and international 
organizations, deal with each other in complex ways, and part of 
the resulting analytical challenge is to evaluate and understand 
those relationships. IR literature’s study of regime formation 
targets this inquiry by trying to determine how and when 
countries will reach agreement and how they cooperate.136 A 
brief examination of this literature helps to frame the analysis of 
the roles played by international organizations. 
Although the bulk of the regime theory literature adopts a 
statist orientation, a growing body of work contemplates 
international regimes as comprising nonstate players, such as 
members of a given industry.137 Most international regime 
theories derive from IR theory’s neoliberal tradition, in which 
states are viewed as “instrumentally rational actors” that pursue 
 
participants seem to exhibit a continued belief that a break with unanimity, which some 
would consider the first step on the path to harmonization, on tax issues is highly 
unlikely. See, e.g., JOHN PETERSON & ELIZABETH BROMBERG, DECISION-MAKING IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 63 (1999) (quoting an EU ambassador, “[T]ax harmonization is not 
going to take place . . . . [I]t all comes down to QMV versus unanimity. It is all that 
matters.”); Eileen O’Grady, United Kingdom Holds Its Ground in Opposing EU Tax 
Harmony, 31 TAX NOTES INT’L 1121, 1122 (2003) (quoting a U.K. government 
spokesman in Brussels: “We have been very clear [that the U.K. wants the EU to pass] 
nothing on tax. Tax is the province of the national states . . . . Anything to do with tax is 
about sovereignty, and the Treasury must have control over how and what is collected. 
The Commission talks about moving to majority voting only on issues of tax 
administration in Europe but that is a slippery slope.”). 
136. Peter Mayer, Volker Rittberger & Michael Zurn, Regime Theory: State of the Art 
and Perspectives, in REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 14, at 
391, 392 (explaining that regime theory focuses on the “possibility, conditions, and 
consequences of international governance”). 
137. See, e.g., Virginia Haufler, Crossing the Boundary Between Public and Private: 
International Regimes and Non-State Actors, in REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS, supra note 14, at 95, 101–09; Ring, supra note 14, at 93–94 n.44. 
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self-interest and reciprocal benefits.138 Under this view, the 
mission for states is to overcome market failure (that is, barriers 
to optimal agreements). International regimes become an 
important tool for combating this market failure. In studying 
regime formation, this literature targets three core elements: (1) 
the type of bargaining game involved,139 (2) the issue at stake,140 
and (3) the background factors.141 
Regime theory work coming from neorealism, the other 
dominant tradition, has generated a response to the neoliberals. 
This thread of neorealism “recognize[s] that regimes can and 
will be formed in the absence of a hegemon but contend[s] that 
power remains at the core of why a particular regime result is 
reached.”142 Specifically, these neorealists contend that where the 
“game” in question has more than one Pareto optimal outcome, 
power becomes decisive in the choice among outcomes. 
Although the neorealists do not argue that the neoliberal 
approach ignores power, they do believe neoliberal accounts give 
inadequate weight to both power and distributional aspects of 
their market failure story. Neorealists highlight several key ways 
in which power shapes the game: (1) deciding who can play; (2) 
setting the rules, including who moves first; and (3) using power 
to change the “payoff matrix” by, for example, linking the game 
 
138. Andrew Hurrell, International Society and the Study of Regimes, in REGIME 
THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 14, at 49, 56; see also Ring, supra 
note 14, 104–05. 
139. A number of different “games” based on game theory models (e.g., 
coordination games, dilemma games) could be in play. See Ring, supra note 14, at 105; 
see also ARTHUR STEIN, WHY NATIONS COOPERATE: CIRCUMSTANCE AND CHOICE IN 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 27–38 (1990). 
140. Different types of issues involve securities, economics, and government 
operation. 
141. A wide range of “background” factors can impact the likelihood of “regime” 
formation, and the regime’s content: frequency of interaction among the parties, 
number of relevant actors, distribution of resources germane to the issue, presence of an 
“obvious” solution, and strong individual leadership. See ANDREAS HASENCLEVER ET AL., 
THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 54–55, 76 (1997); Oran R. Young & Gail 
Osherenko, Testing Theories of Regime, in REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS, supra note 14, at 224, 231 (identifying “individual leadership” as a necessary 
condition for regime change and “salient solutions” as an important condition). 
142. Ring, supra note 14, at 100; see also Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty, Regimes, 
and Human Rights, in REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 14, at 
95, 140 (“Regime creation and maintenance are a function of the distribution of power 
and interests among states[.]”). 
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with other unrelated issues so that only one outcome is Pareto 
efficient and that result is favored by the powerful party.143 
Although neorealism and neoliberalism generally engage 
each other in debate, cognitivism,144 another distinct strand in 
the IR literature, challenges both. Cognitivists argue that both 
the neorealist and neoliberal traditions have failed to recognize 
the importance of perception, knowledge, and ideology in 
international relations.145 They contend that states participate in 
regime formation because they believe they have problems 
meriting such action: “the demand for regimes in international 
relations depends on actors’ perceptions of international 
problems, which are partially produced by their causal and 
normative beliefs.”146 The important question, therefore, is what 
is the source of the states’ beliefs and views about the world and 
events?147 In answering this question, the cognitivists148 proceed 
from certain baseline assumptions: (1) states’ interests, which 
drive their rational decision making, are not a given149 and 
instead derive from their vision of the world; and (2) states 
frequently turn to experts and scientists for advice as the policy 
questions under consideration become more complex and it is 
no longer apparent which position would further their 
interests.150 
Who are these experts (or “epistemic” communities),151 how 
do they function, and how might they exert influence on 
 
143. Stephen D. Krasner, Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto 
Frontier, 43 WORLD POL. 336, 340 (1991); see also Ring, supra note 14, at 101. 
144. Cognitivism itself exhibits both a “strong” and a “weak” version, with only the 
latter engaging with the regime theory project as described in the text above. The 
“strong” expression of cognitivism dismisses the underlying assumption of both 
neorealism and neoliberalism that states are goal maximizers. See HASENCLEVER ET AL., 
supra note 141, at 155; see also Ring, supra note 14, at 110–11. Strong cognitivists envision 
states as “role players” whose decisions are shaped by the specific roles that they take on. 
See HASENCLEVER ET AL., supra note 141, at 155; see also Ring, supra note 14, at 111 n.156. 
145. See HASENCLEVER ET AL., supra note 141, at 137. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. More precisely, the “weak” cognitivists. See supra note 144. 
149. See HASENCLEVER ET AL., supra note 141, at 136 (positing that it is not always 
clear what “rule” will be in a state’s best interests even though it is presumed that a state 
seeks to do what is “best” for itself). 
150. See Ring, supra note 14, at 111. 
151. An epistemic community has been defined as “a network of professionals with 
recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim 
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decision making? What role do international tax organizations 
play in the collection and dissemination of expert knowledge? 
Given the highly technical nature of many tax questions, the 
degree to which one can identify likely networks and groups of 
tax experts working in concert, the stories of international tax 
organizations and tax policy are likely intertwined with the story 
of knowledge and expertise. 
The layers of nuance and complexity added by cognitivists 
seems appropriate for international tax policy analysis, but what 
of the tension between neorealism and neoliberalism? Cognitivist 
theory does not dictate a choice; it simply refines the picture. Is it 
necessary, then, to choose between the two basic strands of IR 
theory—neorealism and neoliberalism—in order to study 
international tax policy? The sensible answer is “no,” because 
these theories should not be viewed as mutually exclusive 
options, but rather as possible descriptions of dynamics in certain 
circumstances. If, for example, a particular problem solved by 
international cooperation involves inadequate information (that 
is, market failure), then neoliberalism and its claims and 
assumptions may be a better fit.152 Alternatively, if a problem 
involves the allocation of the right to tax between two 
jurisdictions (that is, a distributional issue), then neorealism may 
more accurately capture the forces behind the cooperation.153 
There is no reason to believe that all tax policy questions will 
predominantly reflect either market failure or distributional 
tensions. Thus, the different theories may be useful for different 
subsets of tax policy cases. Furthermore, cognitivist theories on 
knowledge and epistemic communities serve as an important 
overlay to both neoliberal and neorealist approaches. In both 
cases, if the actors’ interests are unclear, an epistemic community 
may be positioned to exert influence either on the dominant 
state in cases where power seems more relevant, or on the 
general bargaining framework where market failure concerns 
prevail. In either situation, a true assessment of international tax 
policy formation would require an appreciation for the role of 
knowledge and expertise in shaping the ultimate policy outcome. 
 
to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.” Haas, supra note 133, at 
3. 
152. See Ring, supra note 14, at 113. 
153. See Krasner, supra note 142, at 140. 
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2. Pursuing Policy Formation: Options and Expectations 
What is the best way to capture the complexity of policy 
formation? One option is to investigate through the lens of a 
single issue and consider how the relevant players act and 
interact over time. Alternatively, one could investigate through 
the lens of a particular organization by asking: What does the 
organization do? How does it engage with other actors? How do 
those interactions vary depending on the issue? What is the 
organization’s trajectory? Still another possibility is to take a 
snapshot in time of all the different international tax 
organizations and consider what they are doing at that time. This 
last approach is valuable because it offers the potential to see 
how organizations play different issues and actors off each other 
in a juggle of influence, compromise, and deal-making. 
Of course, the full dynamic of international tax relations 
even for a single issue or topic cannot be captured through 
either a simple chronology or a momentary snapshot of the web 
of connections; many actors are participating in simultaneous 
and interactive engagements. That said, by beginning the process 
of identifying key players in international tax, with respect to 
both their positive dimensions and normative goals, their roles, 
power, and influence can be more precisely delineated. Part II.A 
above tackled this challenge by identifying and examining the 
core questions that need be asked of any international 
organization prior to assessing its role and function. This Section 
continues the analysis by contending that state-based 
international organizations play a unique role in the area of 
international tax policy. This role is by no means exclusive or 
supremely powerful, but it is centralizing. 
Why might we expect international organizations with state-
based membership to have a special role? Despite persuasive 
analysis in the IR literature demonstrating that states are not 
monolithic actors, they remain the formal actors in enacting 
domestic tax legislation that governs cross-border transactions, 
and in signing binding agreements with other states. Thus, for a 
large number of tax issues, actors need a forum in which to 
influence and engage states—a place where states are susceptible 
and receptive to multiple views. An international organization 
can be more than a mere forum, though. The organization itself 
can be an affirmative actor in shaping policy not necessarily 
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completely sua sponte, but neither as a servant of its members. As 
some IR scholars contend, prior IR analysis has underestimated 
or misconstrued the “international organization” as merely an 
instrumentality of the states.154 The professional policy staff of the 
OECD exemplifies the kind of organizational leadership that is 
independent of the states themselves. However, neither the IR 
literature, which advocates a deep and nuanced understanding of 
international organizations, nor the case studies on international 
taxation outlined in Part III, proffers a normative claim as to 
whether such influence is predictably desirable or undesirable. 
Ultimately, though, further case studies on international tax 
organizations should improve the overall assessment of their 
power and influence, and correspondingly direct attention to 
their decision-making processes, accountability, and legitimacy in 
shaping international tax policy.155 
Despite the centralizing role that state-based international 
organizations may play in international tax policy, direct 
engagement with state-based international organizations is not 
the exclusive avenue through which other international 
organizations act. In reality, they follow several very observable 
and different paths that can be understood as extensions of the 
“output” discussion in Part II.B.2. 
a. Lobbying 
Lobbying in the international tax policy arena denotes the 
attempt to directly influence individual states at the national 
level. Even this lobbying is not uniform because a national 
 
154. See, e.g., Barnett & Sikkink, supra note 35, at 7 (“First, the functionalist 
treatment of international institutions and IOs reduced them to technical 
accomplishments, slighting their political character and the political work they do . . . . 
Secondly, the statism of many contemporary treatments of IOs reduced them to mere 
tools of states, akin to how pluralists treated the state.”). New work on IOs emphasizes 
their intrinsic nature as “political creatures” that “construct the social world in which 
cooperation and choice take place . . . [and] help to define the issues that need to be 
governed and propose the means by which governance should occur.” Id. 
155. See id. at 71; see also MICHAEL BARNETT & MARTHA FINNEMORE, RULES FOR THE 
WORLD: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL POLITICS 16–44 (2004); Ruth W. 
Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, 99 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 29, 43 (2005) (exploring conflicting concepts of accountability among 
international organizations). 
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government is not a single mind or body itself.156 In the case of 
democracies, it comprises a range of elected officials and 
executive appointees with decision-making power that on 
balance generates a single national position.157 When lobbying 
the state, successful organizations will take stock of the important 
players and tailor the message so that it resonates with each 
subset of players’ unique concerns and goals. Thus, both the 
exact message and the form of the output from the international 
organization will be calibrated to reach each target audience. 
b. Uniting 
Uniting refers to the effort to coordinate with other 
organizations to provide a more unified and powerful front. For 
example, the World Taxpayers Associations is itself a nonprofit 
organization whose members are taxpayer associations located in 
countries all over the globe.158 According to its founding statute, 
the mission includes “stimulat[ing] contacts and exchanges of 
information between the different countries and their 
organizations” and “enabl[ing] members in one country to 
receive assistance in tax matters from associations in other 
countries.”159 
Even where members are individuals rather than other 
organizations, an organization itself may highlight and promote 
its contacts with other bodies. The EATLP, for example, notes in 
its charter that it “shall pursue its objectives through cooperation 
not only with academic institutions but also with other non-profit 
 
156. Along these lines, some IR scholars argue that the term “government” 
provides greater analytical clarity than the term “state.” They argue that the “concept of 
‘state’ has three very different meanings: a legal person, a political community, and a 
government” and that states vary tremendously in the cohesiveness of the political 
community. Willetts, supra note 18, at 361. Thus, indiscriminate use of the term “state” 
can convey unsupported meaning. These scholars instead focus on “government” when 
discussing formal official actions and interactions, and on the specific nonstate actors 
when considering the multiplicity of forces acting on and under the state’s 
“government.” See id. at 361–62. 
157. This is not to suggest that any dissention at the state-level dissipates. Rather, at 
some point in the process a state must act on tax policy with a single voice, even if there 
are many voices in the background, and even if the background voices eventually drown 
out and replace the initial voice. 
158. See Members of World Taxpayers Associations, supra note 65 (listing member 
organizations from forty-four different countries). 
159. Statutes of World Taxpayers Associations, http://www.worldtaxpayers.org/
statutes.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
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organizations with similar objects, in particular with the 
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation in Amsterdam.”160 
Similarly, IFA highlights its links with other international 
organizations: “IFA has consultative status with the United 
Nations Economic and Social Council. In that capacity, it is 
represented at meetings of the UN Committee of Experts on 
International Tax Cooperation.”161 Thus, the links among many 
international tax organizations are not the byproduct of chance, 
but instead are part of a carefully constructed mission and 
identity. 
c. Diversifying 
Diversifying encompasses simultaneous efforts to contact or 
interact with a number of different bodies, including states, in 
order to establish connections and identify a fertile launching 
point for a plan. Groups such as the Federation of Tax 
Administrators (“FTA”) utilize a wide variety of media in order to 
convey information that shapes tax policy to U.S. states, 
individual members of government, and other international 
organizations.162 TEI, mentioned earlier, states that it has 
advocated “on a range of tax matters to the U.S. Treasury 
Department, the Internal Revenue Service, the tax-writing 
committees of Congress, and in Canada to the Department of 
Finance and the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency. 
Submissions are also filed with the states and provinces.”163 For 
example, when the disclosure of advance pricing agreements 
(“APA”)164 became a prominent international tax question in the 
 
160. EATLP Articles of Association, supra note 60, art. 2(2). The IBFD is a nonprofit 
organization engaged in publication of tax materials and information, research, and 
education. See IBFD’s Academic Activities, http://www.ibfd.org/portal/
AcademicActivities.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
161. IFA Consultative Status, http://www.ifa.nl/organisation/consultative_status/ 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
162. See Facts About the Federation, http:/www.taxadmin.org/fta/ftafact1.html 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
163. TEI Advocacy Overview, http://www.tei.org/news/pages/
advocacyoverview.aspx (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). The Tax Executives Institute (“TEI”) 
anticipates that its expansion into Europe and Asia will open up corresponding advocacy 
opportunities. See id. 
164. An advance pricing agreement (“APA”) is an agreement between the taxpayer 
and the government (or in some cases the taxpayer and the governments of several 
countries) detailing how the taxpayer will handle its pricing of specified transactions 
between certain related parties. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2006-9, § 2.01–04, 2.08, as amended by 
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United States in 1999,165 TEI developed a position on the issue 
and pursued it through multiple forums. In February 1999, TEI 
submitted an amicus brief to the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia in the lawsuit filed by the Bureau of 
National Affairs seeking APA disclosure by the IRS.166 Following 
the submission, TEI had U.S. Treasury Assistant Secretary of Tax 
Policy Donald C. Lubick speak at TEI’s midyear meeting on, 
among other topics, the subject of APA disclosure.167 A few 
months later, TEI’s president offered testimony on the subject of 
APA disclosure before the Committee on Ways & Means of the 
U.S. House of Representatives.168 The following year, the 
 
Rev. Proc. 2008-31 (providing a summary of the APA system in the United States); see 
also I.R.C. § 482 (2006) (law vesting the Secretary of the Treasury with authority to 
regulate the allocation of profits, losses, and deductions among related taxpayers). An 
APA does not establish a price, but rather outlines the method and parameters relevant 
to setting the price. Rev. Proc. 2006-9, § 2.04. If the taxpayer complies with the terms of 
the APA, then the signatory governments agree to respect the resulting transfer prices. 
See Rev. Proc. 2006-9, § 10 (describing the legal effect of an APA). An APA has a set 
term, but can be renewed under some circumstances. See Rev. Proc. 2006-9, § 12. 
165. The question in 1999 was whether the government was required to release and 
publish APAs, perhaps in redacted form. A major legal publisher, the Bureau of 
National Affairs, filed a lawsuit against the IRS in 1996 under the Freedom of 
Information Act to compel public disclosure of the content of APAs. See Bureau of Nat’l 
Affairs, Inc. v. Internal Revenue Serv., 24 F. Supp. 2d 90, 91 (D.D.C. 1998). Much of 
industry and business, including TEI, argued that the APAs should not be disclosed. See, 
e.g., filing cited infra note 166. Following several years of litigation, the IRS changed its 
position after conferring with the Department of Justice and determined that APAs were 
“written determinations” subject to limited disclosure under section 6110 of the Internal 
Revenue Code. See IRS Agrees to Make Redacted APAs Public, Abandons Position in Long-
Standing Lawsuit, 7 Tax Mgmt. Transfer Pricing Rep. (BNA) 650 (Jan. 13, 1999); see also 
Molly Moses, Judge Allows BNA to Propose Schedule for IRS to make APAs Publicly 
Available, 28 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) G-7 (Feb. 11, 1999). Congress ultimately intervened 
in 1999 to bar disclosure of APAs even in redacted form. See I.R.C. § 6110(b)(1). 
166. Memorandum of Tax Executives Institute, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Opposition 
to Plaintiff Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Bureau of 
Nat’l Affairs, Inc. v. IRS, No. 1:98-cv-01473 (D.D.C. Feb. 25, 1999). The February 2009 
brief had been “prepared under the aegis of the Institute’s International and IRS 
Administrative Affairs Committee [and] was approved by TEI’s Executive Committee.” 
51 TAX EXECUTIVE, 155, 155 (1999). 
167. Honorable Donald Lubick, U.S. Treasury Assistant Sec’y on Tax Policy, 
Remarks at the Tax Executives Institute (Mar. 23, 1999), in 19 TAX NOTES TODAY 56-29 
(1999); see also Lubick Says Legislation May Be Needed to Limit APA Background File 
Disclosures, 7 Tax Mgmt. Transfer Pricing Rep. (BNA) 876 (Mar. 24, 1999). A copy of 
Assistant Secretary Lubick’s remarks is electronically available at http://www.treas.gov/
press/releases/rr3035.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
168. See Current U.S. International Tax Regime: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Oversight of the H. Comm. of Ways & Means, 106th Cong. 20–34 (June 22, 1999) 
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Canadian government invited TEI’s Canadian Income Tax 
Committee to meet with the Canadian Customs and Revenue 
Agency to “engage in private consultations on a draft 
information circular relating to” APAs.169 The scope of TEI’s 
advocacy and engagement on the subject of APAs reflects its 
strategy of operating on different fronts simultaneously in the 
pursuit of the organization’s goals. 
d. Researching 
Research refers to development of a research agenda to 
support a policy line advocated through lobbying, uniting, and 
diversifying. Evidence of attention to both research and written 
analysis can be witnessed in organizations ranging from the 
OECD, which publishes a wide variety of material,170 to the CFP, 
which has supported its primary mission of objecting to the 
OECD tax competition work by publishing papers such as The 
Global Flat Tax Revolution: Lessons for Policy Makers.171 
Of course, not all of the issues pursued by each and every 
international tax organization will follow the same path. 
Arguably, a goal of reduced taxation can be pursued either by 
changing states’ tax policies or by “facilitating” tax planning. For 
example, the ITPA describes itself as an organization that adopts 
“the point of view of the taxpayer” and whose “membership is 
limited to practitioners who act for or in the interests of 
taxpayers.”172 The organization’s goal is to “disseminate and 
exchange information about international tax planning.”173 A 
significant feature of the Association’s meetings is: 
 
(testimony and statement of Lester Ezrati. General Tax Counsel, Hewlett-Packard Co., 
and President, Tax Executives Institute). 
169. TEI Consults on Draft Information Circular for APAs, 52 TAX EXECUTIVE 348, 348 
(2000). 
170. The OECD produces a range of publications, including assessments of 
member and nonmember economies, factbooks, economic surveys, comparative 
analyses, case studies, and policy briefs on many tax- and nontax-related topics. See Tax: 
Publications and Documents, http://www.oecd.org/findDocument/
0,3354,en_2649_37427_1_1_1_1_37427,00.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
171. See Daniel J. Mitchell, The Global Flat Tax Revolution: Lessons for Policy Makers, 
8(1) PROSPERITAS 1, 1–12 (2008), http://www.freedomandprosperity.org/Papers/
flattax/flattax.shtml. 
172. A Brief History of the ITPA and Why You Should Join, supra note 52. 
173. Id. 
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[T]he opportunity it offers to form contacts with 
practitioners in other jurisdictions. The programmes at our 
meetings are not overcrowded—deliberately so. There are 
opportunities during each of the two days and at the 
receptions in the evenings to mingle with other members. It 
is virtually impossible to come away from a meeting of the 
Association not having learned something new and useful, 
and not having made at least one contact which proves 
valuable.174 
It is not unreasonable to infer that ITPA believes that many of its 
goals (focused on reducing taxes paid) can be achieved without 
engaging states themselves. 
Of course, evasion aside, taxation does depend on the 
states175 because the affirmative act of taxation is purely and 
formally a state function.176 The case studies in Part III below 
offer initial insights into the roles played by international tax 
organizations and into the special status occupied by state-based 
organizations. 
III. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION CASE STUDIES 
A. Emergence of a Mandatory Arbitration Clause in the OECD Model 
Income Tax Treaty 
In summer 2008, the OECD revised its model income tax 
treaty by adding a new paragraph to the provision governing 
mutual agreement procedures (“MAP”).177 The new language 
provides for mandatory arbitration in certain circumstances.178 
Interestingly, the concept of mandatory arbitration in 
international tax has been a long-standing source of 
controversy.179 The story behind the decision to support 
 
174. Id. 
175. Even taxpayers pursuing strategies of evasion have an incentive to lobby or 
advocate against various kinds of substantive and administrative rules that could make 
their current strategies more difficult and less effective. 
176. See Ring, supra note 17, at 166; see also DOUGHERTY & PFALTZGRAFF, supra note 
19, at 33. 
177. See OECD, The 2008 Update to the OECD Model Tax Convention 4, July 18, 2008, 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/34/41032078.pdf. 
178. See id. 
179. See, e.g., Ehab Farah, Mandatory Arbitration of International Tax Disputes: A 
Solution in Search of a Problem 6–8 (Mar. 18, 2008) (unpublished, available at 
http://ssrn.com/absract=1115178). 
RING_K-FINAL 5/22/2010 2:58 PM 
690 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:649 
mandatory arbitration provides a valuable opportunity to assess 
the roles and interactions among a variety of international 
organizations. 
1. The Story Behind the Mandatory Arbitration Clause 
While the use of mandatory arbitration is certainly not new, 
and prominently appears in a variety of other international 
contexts, it has not historically found its way into international 
tax agreements.180 The mutual agreement provision in the typical 
income tax treaty provides mechanisms for dispute resolution 
(e.g., when two countries seek to tax a taxpayer in inconsistent 
ways which would result in the taxpayer facing double 
taxation).181 However, these provisions leave open the possibility 
that the dispute will not be resolved and that the taxpayer will 
have little recourse to force reconciliation of the issue.182 As a 
result, the goal of ensuring resolution of international tax 
disputes gained a prominent place on the agendas of global 
taxpayers and business-related organizations, including the ICC. 
What is the ICC? The organization was founded in 1919 “to 
serve world business by promoting trade and investment, open 
markets for goods and services, and the free flow of capital.”183 
ICC members include thousands of businesses and associations 
from approximately thirty different countries.184 The ICC’s 
supreme governing body, the ICC World Council, meets twice a 
year.185 When the Council meets, each national committee names 
 
180. See id. at 4. 
181. See id. at 5. 
182. See Hugh Ault, Improving the Resolution of International Tax Disputes, 7 FLA. TAX 
REV. 137, 140 (2005) (“The [Mutual Agreement Procedure] takes too long; it is costly 
and the taxpayer must incur expenses with no assurance of acceptable outcome. It is 
often necessary to pay tax in order to get into the process and then the interest paid if 
the taxpayer wins is not adequate and cannot be offset against the interest that the 
taxpayer has to pay the other jurisdiction.”). 
183. What Is ICC?, http://www.iccwbo.org/id93/index.html (last visited Apr. 3, 
2010). 
184. See id.; see also Links to ICC Member Companies, supra note 64 (listing a 
selection of ICC member companies). 
185. How ICC Works?, http://www.iccwbo.org/id96/index.html; see also ICC, 
Constitution of the International Chamber of Commerce, art. 5(7), June 8, 2009 [hereinafter 
ICC Constitution], available at http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedfiles/icc/
icc_home_page/pages/icc_constitution_en_8_june_2009.pdf (governing the frequency 
with which the World Council must convene). The World Council is described by the 
ICC as “the equivalent of the general assembly of a major intergovernmental 
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a business executive as their delegate and ten seats are open for 
direct delegates from countries in which there is no national 
committee.186 The Council is responsible for appointing the 
secretary-general and electing the chairman, vice-chairman, and 
the executive board.187 The executive board, in turn, establishes 
the various ICC commissions and their missions based on 
proposals from the Committee on Policy and Commissions.188 
The relevant tax body, the Commission on Taxation, is 
composed of experts in international taxation who review 
“developments in international fiscal policy and legislation and 
put forward business views on government and 
intergovernmental projects affecting taxation.”189 The 
Commission meets twice per year and operates with roughly 130 
members, plus observers from other international tax 
organizations, such as BIAC, IFA, the International Bar 
Association, the International Stock Exchange Federation, and 
the Union of Industries of the European Community 
(“UNICE”).190 
The Commission has promoted mandatory arbitration since 
as early as 1995.191 More specifically, the Commission argued that 
the mutual agreement procedure set forth in the model treaties 
was unsatisfactory and that the competent authorities192 should 
 
organization” with the exception that “delegates are business executives and not 
government officials.” How ICC Works?, supra note 183. 
186. See ICC Constitution, supra note 185, arts. 3(5)(a), 4(5). A national committee 
represents the ICC in its respective country. See id. art. 3(1), (4). At present there are 
eighty-four national committees. See What Is ICC?, supra note 183; see also ICC National 
Committee Network and Group, http://www.iccwbo.org/id100/index.html (last visited 
Apr. 3, 2010) (listing each national committee by country and geographic region). 
187. See ICC Constitution, supra note 185, art. 5(3)(a)186. 
188. See ICC Constitution, supra note 185, art. 10(2). 
189. ICC’s Commission on Taxation, http://www.iccwbo.org/policy/taxation/
id1194/index.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
190. See Commission on Taxation, How Does it Work?, http://www.iccwbo.org/
policy/taxation/id1195/index.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
191. See ICC, Comm’n on Taxation, The Revision of the U.N. Model Tax Convention 
Between Developed and Developing Countries and Related Issues, pt. 1, § 12, Doc. No. 
180/402, Nov. 24, 1995, available at http://www.iccwbo.org/policy/taxation/id360/
index.html (submitted to the U.N. Ad Hoc Group of Experts on International 
Cooperation in Tax Matters). 
192. Competent authorities are government representatives designated pursuant to 
the treaty. They are meant to attempt to resolve the problem prior to the 
implementation of the mutual agreement procedure. If the competent authorities of the 
states in question are unable to come to an agreement on how the taxpayer should be 
taxed, then the mutual agreement procedure is followed. Under traditional treaties, 
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be required to reach a resolution of disputes with taxpayer 
involvement, offering arbitration as one possibility.193 
In 2000, the Commission on Taxation again turned its 
attention to mandatory arbitration and issued a policy statement 
in which they recommended that “compulsory and binding 
arbitration in international tax matters should be adopted in 
bilateral or multilateral tax conventions.”194 The ICC explicitly 
directed its policy statement to the OECD, describing the OECD 
as the “appropriate forum” in which to develop the system of 
mandatory arbitration and encourage its inclusion in bilateral 
and multilateral treaties.195 The policy statement offered detailed 
reasoning as to why the current mutual agreement procedures 
were inadequate, including: (1) the likelihood of double taxation 
under the existing MAP, (2) frequent exclusion of taxpayers 
from the deliberations, (3) lack of procedural rules or time 
limits, (4) procedural conflicts regarding competent authority, 
domestic examination, and appeals rules, and (5) delays in 
arriving at a conclusion to the competent authority stage.196 The 
analysis included a review of the EU Convention, U.S. treaty 
practice, and the OECD’s dispute resolution practices.197 The 
ICC then stipulated the essential characteristics of an effective 
arbitration clause. They recommended: (1) initiation by states 
(jointly or individually) or by taxpayers themselves, (2) 
compulsory participation, (3) binding decisions, (4) appropriate 
scope and basis, (5) procedural fairness enforced by control 
mechanisms, (6) taxpayer participation throughout the process, 
and (7) implementation of the decision by the state.198 These 
suggestions were aimed at producing three outcomes: getting the 
 
there was no authority under the mutual agreement procedure to force the contracting 
states to resolve their dispute. See Farah, supra note 179, at 11. 
193. See The Revision of the U.N. Model Tax Convention Between Developed and 
Developing Countries and Related Issues, supra note 191, pt. 1, § 12. 
194. See ICC, Comm’n on Taxation, Arbitration in International Tax Matters, Doc. 
No. 180/438, May 3, 2000, available at http://www.iccwbo.org/policy/taxation/id442/
index.html. This paper was eventually memorialized by the U.N. in ECOSOC, Ad Hoc 
Group of Experts on Int’l Cooperation in Tax Matters, Arbitration in International Tax 
Matters, 2, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. ST/SG/AC.8/2001/CRP.15 (Aug. 29, 2001) (prepared by ICC, 
Comm’n on Taxation) [hereinafter Arbitration in International Tax Matters]. 
195. See Arbitration in International Tax Matters, supra note 194, at 5. 
196. See id. at 2–3. 
197. See id. at 3–5. 
198. See id. at 5–6. 
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parties to the arbitration table, ensuring that the necessary issues 
are resolved in a fair manner, and producing a binding decision 
for the parties to enforce.199 In this way, the ICC pushed for the 
OECD to create a procedure which states would be obligated to 
utilize. The ICC argued that a mandatory arbitration provision 
would resolve the enumerated problems because it would be 
impartial, time limited, predictable, transparent, and involve the 
taxpayer.200 
Beyond a general exhortation to pursue mandatory 
arbitration seriously, the ICC’s statements offered concrete 
advice to the OECD. At the time the ICC was releasing this 
statement, the OECD Model Tax Convention did not contain an 
arbitration clause, although commentary in the then-existing 
model treaty did note that arbitration was a possible solution 
when competent authorities reach an impasse.201 Moreover, the 
OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs had previously agreed to 
study mandatory arbitration and to supplement its transfer 
pricing guidelines with the outcome of that research.202 With 
these tentative OECD commitments in place, the ICC urged the 
OECD to contemplate arbitration for tax matters outside of 
transfer pricing, and to study the plausibility of a multilateral 
arbitration convention.203 
Continuing its push for arbitration, the ICC’s Commission 
on Taxation issued another policy statement in 2002, this time 
including draft language that could be inserted as a model treaty 
provision.204 The draft provision was prepared to correspond with 
the OECD’s own model treaty, and provided a timeline for 
requesting arbitration, a mechanism for selecting an arbitration 
board, a specified role for the taxpayer, and a binding resolution 
from the board.205 
 
199. See id. at 2. 
200. See id. 
201. See MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL art. 25 cmts. ¶ 48 
(OECD 2000). 
202. See OECD, COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES FOR 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND TAX ADMINISTRATIONS ¶¶ 4.167–4.171 (1995 ed.). 
203. See Arbitration in International Tax Matters, supra note 194, at 5. 
204. See ICC, Comm’n on Taxation, Arbitration in International Tax Matters: Bilateral 
Convention Article, Doc. 180/455 Rev. 2, Feb. 6, 2002, available at http://www.iccwbo.org/
policy/taxation/id501/index.html. 
205. See id. 
RING_K-FINAL 5/22/2010 2:58 PM 
694 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:649 
Although the ICC had been encouraging the OECD to 
pursue mandatory arbitration for a number of years, the primary 
impetus for the OECD’s efforts in this area, starting in 2003, was 
that the growing volume of cross border transactions would 
inevitably increase the number of tax disputes between and 
among countries.206 The OECD began to recognize that the 
mutual agreement procedure approach in bilateral tax treaties 
was under strain due to the volume of cases and their 
complexity.207 
As a result of this understanding, the OECD’s Committee on 
Fiscal Affairs (“CFA”), in 2003, convened a joint working group 
(“JWG”) comprising government officials with tax treaty or 
transfer pricing expertise.208 The JWG was created to improve the 
effectiveness of the mutual agreement procedure and 
supplemental dispute resolution mechanisms.209 In undertaking 
the project, the JWG: (1) solicited information from member 
counties; (2) held a consultation in Paris with the private sector; 
(3) had input from non-OECD economies through the Global 
Forum on Taxation; and (4) issued a questionnaire to elicit 
initial comments regarding dispute resolution and to provide an 
opportunity for people and organizations to contribute previous 
experiences with the system and ideas as to how it could be 
 
206. See OECD, Ctr. for Tax Policy & Admin., Improving the Process for Resolving 
International Tax Disputes, ¶ 1, July, 27, 2004 [hereinafter OECD Recommendations for 
Improving International Tax Disputes], available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/44/6/
33629447.pdf. 
207. See id.; see also Jeffrey Owens, The OECD’s Work on Dispute Settlements in Tax 
Matters: A Progress Report, 41 TAX NOTES INT’L 1056, 1057 (2006) (using similar language 
from the director of the OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration). 
208. See OECD Sets Up Joint Working Group on Using Arbitration in Competent Authority, 
11 Tax Mgmt. Transfer Pricing Rep. (BNA) 143 (May 29, 2002); Press Release, OECD, 
OECD Launches Project on Improving the Resolution of Cross-Border Tax Disputes 
(n.d.), available at http://www.oecd.org/document/26/
0,3343,en_2649_33753_2508762_1_1_1_1,00.html; see also James Morgan, New 
Developments in the Resolution of International Tax Disputes, 43 TAX NOTES INT’L 77, 77 
(2006). The joint working group was composed of “Working Party 1 (Double Tax 
Conventions) and Working Party 6 (Transfer Pricing) delegates from OECD Member 
States’ tax administrations.” Commission of the European Communities, EU Joint 
Transfer Pricing Forum: Secretariat Discussion Paper on Alternative Dispute Avoidance 
and Resolution Procedures, JTPF/003/2005/EN, at 3, ¶ 8 (Mar. 10, 2005), reprinted in 
WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Apr. 22, 2005, 2005 WTD 77-11; see also OECD Sets Up Joint 
Working Group, supra, at 143 (quoting two officials from the IRS). 
209. See Jeffrey Owens, Improving and Supplementing Tax Dispute Resolution 
Procedures, 36 TAX NOTES INT’L 739 (2004); Press Release, OECD, supra note 208. 
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improved.210 The JWG identified a number of areas in which the 
existing dispute resolution procedures could be improved.211 It 
developed proposals, but acknowledged that additional problems 
might surface dictating additional research before more concrete 
and final proposals could be drafted.212 The JWG’s 2004 progress 
report discussed what it learned during the consultation in Paris 
in 2003, and what had been the successes and failures of other 
existing arbitration programs.213 The report indicated that the 
JWG would continue to analyze the feasibility of implementing a 
mandatory arbitration resolution of unresolved MAP cases, and 
that no decision had yet been reached on whether to support 
such a proposal.214 
During this period IFA also produced a list of suggestions 
for the proposed OECD arbitration clause.215 While many 
mirrored the ICC’s proposals, there were several marked 
differences: (1) “reference to an appointing authority for 
arbitrators,” which would be the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
in The Hague; (2) “a control mechanism to address aberrant 
awards” in the form of a challenge process; (3) “coordination 
with the United Nations Arbitration Convention” in defining the 
proceedings; and (4) “a lis alibi pendens provision that suspends 
litigation until conclusion of the arbitral proceedings.”216 
Additionally, the IFA proposal included different procedural 
mechanisms than those in the ICC model, “such as provision for 
(a) Terms of Reference; (b) jurisdictional limits; (c) language of 
proceedings; (d) arbitral situs; (e) interim measures; (f) 
penalties; (g) arbitrator qualification; (h) declaratory relief; and 
 
210. See OECD Recommendations for Improving International Tax Disputes, supra note 
206, ¶ 8. 
211. See id. ¶ 9. 
212. See id. ¶ 12. For a list of each proposal and suggestion for future work, see id. 
annex 1. 
213. See id. ¶ 127 (specifically referencing the 1990 EU Convention on the 
Elimination on Double Taxation in Connection with the Adjustment of Profits of 
Associated Enterprises). 
214. See id. ¶¶ 133–35. 
215. The list of the IFA proposals is reproduced in OECD Recommendations for 
Improving International Tax Disputes, supra note 206, annex 4. These suggestions, 
however, come from a more comprehensive work that was sponsored by the IFA. See 
WILLIAM W. PARK & DAVID R. TILLINGHAST, INCOME TAX TREATY ARBITRATION (2004). 
216. OECD Recommendations for Improving International Tax Disputes, supra note 206, 
annex 4. 
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(i) ‘last best offer’ (baseball) arbitration.”217 IFA provided 
alternatives in each section of its proposal in contrast to the 
model language of the ICC proposal, which included no 
options.218 This approach bespeaks a desire of IFA to directly 
apply its language verbatim—or near verbatim—as opposed to 
the ICC’s seeming desire to merely generate ideas and leave 
activity of shaping the precise language to the JWG. 
Finally, in February 2006, the JWG released a public 
discussion draft regarding proposals for improving dispute 
resolution, including a proposal to amend article 25 of the model 
treaty and its corresponding commentary.219 The goal of the draft 
was to present more detailed proposals and draft language that 
could be discussed during a public consultation in Tokyo in 
March 2006 and that could be the subject of written 
comments.220 The 2006 consultation221 was held in conjunction 
with BIAC,222 and drew over 150 participants, including senior 
tax executives from multinational firms, international tax experts 
and academics, representatives from the OECD members’ 
governments, and key participants from the OECD’s group 
dealing with the issue.223 The JWG then held another 
consultation in Washington, D.C., for comments by the business 
community, member countries, and tax professionals.224 
 
217. Id. 
218. Id. 
219. See OECD, Proposals for Improving Mechanisms for the Resolution of Tax Treaty 
Disputes, Feb. 1, 2006, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/20/36054823.pdf. 
A copy of this discussion draft is also available in 14 Tax Mgmt. Transfer Pricing Rep. 
(BNA) 846 (Feb. 15, 2006). 
220. See OECD, Press Release, The Release of a Public Discussion Draft for the 
Upcoming Tokyo Consultation (Feb. 8, 2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/
document/3/0,3343,en_2649_37989739_36037635_1_1_1_1,00.html. For an description 
of the content of the conference, see Toshio Aratitake, OECD Draft on Dispute Resolution 
Well Received at Tokyo Consultation, 52 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), at G-4 (Mar. 17, 2006). An 
agenda for the meeting can be found at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/52/
36054180.pdf. 
221. See Press Release, OECD, OECD Aims to Improve International Tax Disputes 
Mechanisms (Mar. 13, 2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/document/28/
0,3343,en_2649_37989739_36271004_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
222. Id. 
223. See id.; see also OECD, Improving the Resolution of Tax Treaty Disputes, ¶ 4, Feb. 7, 
2007, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/59/38055311.pdf. 
224. See Joint OECD/U.S. Business Conference on OECD Initiatives in 
International Taxation: Looking Ahead, http://www.oecd.org/document/20/
0,3343,en_2649_33753_36255444_1_1_1_37427,00.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2010); see 
also Press Release, U.S. Council for Int’l Bus., Conference Underscores Role of OECD 
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The ICC reentered the policy arena in May 2006. 
Recognizing the interactive nature of the mission upon which it 
had embarked, the ICC hosted a conference of its own, The 
Resolution of International Tax Disputes Through Arbitration.225 The 
goal of the conference was to “unravel some of the issues 
regarding the arbitral process by offering participants the chance 
to hear perspectives of prominent experts in the fields of 
international taxation and international arbitration.”226 The array 
of panel participants reveals the connections among 
international organizations active in this issue area. Participants 
included: (1) Mary Bennett, head of the Tax Treaty Transfer 
Pricing & Financial Transactions Division of the OECD’s Centre 
for Tax Policy and Administration, (2) Robert Couzin, the 
incoming chair of the ICC Commission on Taxation and also a 
member of IFA’s Permanent Scientific Committee, (3) David 
Tillinghast, former chair of IFA’s Permanent Scientific 
Committee, and (4) a number of academics.227 
In January 2007, the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs, 
which commissioned the work of the JWG, adopted a report 
providing new language for the text and commentary of the 
article of the Model Tax Convention governing MAP.228 The 
primary change from the prior draft to this final version was the 
deletion of a requirement that the party making the arbitration 
request waive its rights to domestic remedies as a condition of 
requesting arbitration.229 Business participants at the Tokyo 
consultation were the primary forces behind this change.230 The 
new OECD model treaty released in July 2008 included the 
mandatory arbitration provision.231 
 
on International Taxes (June 6, 2006), available at http://www.uscib.org/
index.asp?documentID=3491. 
225. See Press Release, ICC, ICC to Host Conference on International Tax Disputes 
(Mar. 31 2006), available at http://www.iccwbo.org/collection22/folders57/id6706/
printpage.html. 
226. Id. 
227. See id. 
228. See Improving the Resolution of Tax Treaty Disputes, supra note 223. 
229. See id. ¶ 5. 
230. See id. 
231. See, e.g., Joann M. Weiner, OECD Updates Model Tax Convention, 51 TAX NOTES 
INT’L 89 (2008). 
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The U.N., the other major international organization with 
an established model income tax treaty,232 also entered the 
arbitration design business. As early as 2003, and as recently as 
the U.N. tax committee’s last official discussion in 2008, the U.N. 
has debated the issue of implementing mandatory arbitration 
provisions to settle tax disputes.233 The committee has recognized 
and evaluated the mandatory arbitration clauses espoused by 
both the EU and OECD, but concluded that more research 
needed to be done on workable possibilities for developing and 
developed countries.234 In its most recent report, the committee 
advised that a memorandum of understanding (“MOU”) 
outlining the arbitration process in detail should be established 
before any disputes arose.235 These MOUs would cover such 
topics as the relationship among the arbitration, local court 
proceedings, and the mutual agreement procedures established 
by treaty.236 The committee concluded by observing that more 
familiarity with certain underlying substantive tax rules would be 
required before implementing a successful arbitration scheme.237 
However, the committee recommended that an arbitration 
 
232. See U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, U.N. MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION 
CONVENTION BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, U.N. Doc. 
ST/ESA/PAD/SER.E./21 (2001); see also U.N. DEP’T OF INT’L ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS 
[DIESA], U.N. MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/102, U.N. Sales No. E.80.XVI.3 (1980). 
The U.N. began its exploration of tax treaties in 1968 through its Ad Hoc Group of 
Experts on Tax Treaties between Developed and Developing Countries. See ECOSOC 
Res. 1273 (XLII), supra note 94, ¶ 1 (requesting the creation of a working group to 
facilitate “the conclusion of tax treaties between developed and developing countries”). 
Over the course of seven meetings between 1968 and 1977, the group formalized a set of 
guidelines for the negotiation of bilateral tax treaties. See DIESA, MANUAL FOR THE 
NEGOTIATION OF BILATERAL TAX TREATIES BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/94, U.N. Sales No. E.79.XVI.3 (1979). 
233. See ECOSOC, Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Int’l Cooperation in Tax Matters, 
Intermediation and Arbitration: the Arbitration Convention of the European Union for the 
Resolution of Transfer Pricing Disputes, U.N. Doc. ST/SG/AC.8/203/L.8 (Aug. 27, 2003) 
(prepared by Juan Lopez Rodriquez); see also Report on the Fourth Session (20–24 October 
2008), supra note 43, ¶¶ 61–69. 
234. See ECOSOC, Comm. of Experts on Int’l Cooperation in Tax Matters, Revision 
of the United Nations Model Resolution of Tax Treaty Disputes, ¶¶ 23–28, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.18/2005/3/Add.1 (Dec. 5, 2005) (prepared by Pascal Saint-Amans) 
235. See Report on the Fourth Session (20–24 October 2008), supra note 208, ¶ 65. 
236. See id. ¶ 64. 
237. See id. ¶ 66. 
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provision should be included in any future U.N. Model Tax 
Convention.238 
2. Analysis of the Mandatory Arbitration Clause Story 
What is there to learn from the story of how the OECD 
incorporated mandatory arbitration in the model treaty? The 
case study highlights a number of points regarding the 
participation of different international organizations. 
About the issue. As suggested at the outset of the Article, many 
problems of international tax require more than unilateral 
solutions. Treaty terms and model treaties have been among the 
earliest tax questions for which international organizations have 
assumed responsibility.239 Thus, to the extent mandatory 
arbitration concerned the reform of the treaty implementation 
process, the locus of this action at the international organization 
level is unsurprising. Moreover, the specific treaty problem—the 
inability of competent authorities to reach a consistent outcome 
although each collects its intended revenue—signals an issue that 
states are unlikely to make a top unilateral priority. 
About the actors. A number of international organizations 
played an active and public role in the process culminating in the 
OECD mandatory arbitration provision. But a primary and 
persistent mover in the process was the ICC. Why did it play that 
role? Consider the issue at stake—unlike many other tax 
problems that either foster substantive interest among states and 
taxpayers (for example, transfer pricing) or exclusively among 
states (for example, tax shelters), unsuccessful MAP negotiations 
are fundamentally a taxpayer problem. The ICC members, which 
are businesses, were precisely the subset of actors most likely to 
take the failure of MAP seriously. Although in theory countries 
should desire rules and procedures that constitute a fair system, 
the burden of unsuccessful MAP negotiations ultimately falls on 
the taxpayer. One could imagine an administration adopting the 
view that in a world of sovereign and independent tax systems, it 
should not have to unilaterally sacrifice revenue. After all, 
taxpayers have regularly relied on cross-border tax arbitrage to 
their advantage; they justify it as the inevitable result of 
 
238. See id. ¶ 68. 
239. See Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 3. 
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compliance with independent and uncoordinated systems. But 
given the fundamental and explicit premise of bilateral tax 
treaties—that double taxation is undesirable—it is not altogether 
surprising that states could be prompted to support changes to 
the OECD model and their own bilateral treaties. 
The ICC assisted in this “prompting.” As perhaps one of the 
largest business-based international organizations, the ICC was a 
prime candidate for raising this issue. Its membership base, 
consisting of thousands of businesses across the globe,240 would 
have a collective interest and relatively uniform view of this 
problem. Although the ICC undertook an examination and 
pursuit of a mandatory arbitration provision, it recognized that 
its role was limited. It could effectively research and document 
the failures of the current MAP system, and even draft potential 
arbitration clauses, but ultimately another organization would 
need to carry the reform through to fruition—namely, the 
OECD. 
Not only did the ICC acknowledge its limitations, it 
specifically identified the OECD as the proper international 
body, and explicitly directed its recommendations to the 
OECD.241 Why? In one sense the answer is obvious: MAP is part of 
the bilateral treaty process and the OECD model treaty is 
probably the dominant force in the world of tax treaty design.242 
 
240. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
241. See supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
242. See Yariv Brauner, An International Tax Regime in Crystallization, 56 TAX L. REV. 
259, 310 (2003) (portraying the OECD model treaty as “practically the infrastructure of 
the current bilateral treaty-based system”); Allison D. Christians, Tax Treaties for 
Investment and Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 639, 653 (2005) (describing 
the OECD convention as the “standard” that nearly 2000 tax treaties are based upon). 
Although the U.N. also has a model treaty, see supra note 232, it was released well after 
the OECD treaty and followed the basic structure of the OECD model, making various 
adjustments consistent with the needs of developing countries. See U.N. MODEL DOUBLE 
TAXATION CONVENTION BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 
232, intro. ¶ 9 (noting that drafting committee used the OECD model treaty as a “main 
reference text” when crafting the U.N. model convention). The U.S. model, which also 
closely tracks the OECD model, functions by definition as the U.S. starting point for 
treaty negotiations. See UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF NOVEMBER 
15, 2006, [1 IRS Forms] Tax Treaties (CCH) ¶ 209 (U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 2006), 
available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/hp16801.pdf; see also Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury Issues New Version of the U.S. Model Income 
Tax Convention and Model Technical Explanation, Doc. HP-168 (Nov. 15, 2006), 
available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp168.htm (noting that the U.S. 
model is the starting point for all bilateral tax negotiations with other countries). 
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Mandatory arbitration constituted a refinement of the MAP 
process and was thus properly located in the body responsible for 
crafting MAP originally, the OECD. However, there is another 
complementary way to understand the OECD’s role. States are 
international actors that ultimately must reform the actual treaty 
process. Despite the significant influence exercised by many 
actors in the shaping of international tax policy, states retain a 
pivotal role that cannot be “usurped.”243 It is the state that 
imposes and collects the taxes in question. A change in the 
process requires states’ participation and support. Thus, it 
becomes crucial for the ICC and other interested parties to get 
the issue on the agenda of a state-based organization such as the 
OECD. 
Policy Development. Once the OECD acknowledged its more 
serious and immediate interest in mandatory arbitration with the 
convening of the Joint Working Group,244 a dynamic exchange 
unfolded. The OECD itself, through the JWG, sought 
information on treaty dispute resolution in an iterative process. 
The JWG invited comments from a full range of potentially 
interested parties including its own members, nonmembers,245 
and businesses.246 In addition, other international organizations 
interjected, offering their own suggestions. For example, IFA 
provided suggestions for the mandatory arbitration clause that 
the OECD had already started to draft.247 The ICC also returned 
to the stage in 2006 seemingly eager to ensure that the 
arbitration issue maintained its high profile and that any 
remaining tensions could be vetted by an expert panel.248 
Moreover, this expert panel itself comprised key figures from 
prominent international tax organizations. The conference 
featured the OECD’s head of Tax Treaty Transfer Pricing and 
Financial Transactions, the ICC’s chair, and two IFA Permanent 
Scientific Committee members (one current, one former). Both 
 
243. In contrast, it is possible to imagine the private sector intervening and taking 
over a variety of typically “state” functions including security, business standards, and 
social welfare. 
244. See sources cited supra note 208 and accompanying text. 
245. Note that many treaties are with non-OECD countries. 
246. See supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
247. See supra notes 215–18. 
248. See supra notes 225–27. 
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the MAP problem and the mandatory arbitration solution were 
understood to be part of a global tax discussion. 
B. The Effort to Limit “Harmful” Tax Competition 
Another interesting story of international tax policy created 
through the interactions of multiple international actors over a 
decade involved international tax competition. In its broadest 
terms, “tax competition” refers to a country’s efforts to draw 
business, investment, or money into the country by making its tax 
system attractive to potential taxpayers.249 More specifically, 
countries reduce or eliminate tax on particular activities or 
classes of taxpayers, or refrain from disclosing information to 
other governments.250 
In the last two decades of the twentieth century, 
globalization and growing capital mobility increased the 
possibility of successful competition and countries responded by 
pursuing tax policies designed to enhance their appeal.251 The 
OECD highlighted some of the problems posed by the rapid 
increase in globalization in its 1998 report on tax competition.252 
Although most tax actors would acknowledge that certain forms 
of tax competition in the international arena are both 
 
249. See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, INST. FOR INT’L ECON., U.S. TAXATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL INCOME: BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 29 (1992) (positing that “[t]ax 
competition often starts when one country lowers its tax rates in an effort to attract 
outside investment”); Mitchell A. Kane & Edward B. Rock, Corporate Taxation and 
International Charter Competition, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1233–34 (2009) 
(acknowledging that jurisdictions often exploit differentials in tax systems in order to 
attract capital); see also Julie Roin, Competition and Evasion: Another Perspective on 
International Tax Competition, 89 GEO. L.J. 543, 546–49 (2001) (appreciating the 
relationship between reduced business taxation and investment and describing the 
general practices of the United States and Europe). 
250. See, e.g., Adam H. Rosenzweig, Harnessing the Costs of International Tax 
Arbitrage, 26 VA. TAX REV. 555, 587 n.60 (2007) (“Tax competition arises from the 
intentional use of tax rates or special tax regimes by states, such as “ring fencing” and 
secrecy laws, to attract capital.”); see also Yoram Margoliath, Tax Competition, Foreign 
Direct Investment and Growth: Using the Tax System to Promote Developing Countries, 23 VA. 
TAX REV. 161, 187–90 (2003) (defining tax incentives as a particularized deviation from 
a baseline and providing examples). 
251. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 13, at 1575–76 (“The mobility of capital has 
resulted in international tax competition, in which sovereign countries aim to attract 
both portfolio and direct investment by lowering their tax rates on income earned by 
foreigners.”). 
252. See OECD, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue, Apr. 9, 1998, 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/0/1904176.pdf. 
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appropriate and beneficial,253 some forms of tax competition 
were considered “harmful.” As the OECD and others ultimately 
articulated, “harmful” tax competition was undesirable because it 
would create a race to the bottom in tax revenue and result in 
the erosion of countries’ tax bases.254 Because the race involves 
the reduction or complete elimination of taxation on mobile 
factors (e.g., investment), states would be left dependent on 
consumption and payroll taxes to fund government.255 A tax 
burden premised on such a tax base would be more regressive 
and would lead to a decline in revenue available to fund state 
infrastructure and social welfare programs.256 The significant, but 
not universal, concern over the trajectory of tax competition 
prompted OECD action and a decade of dialogue, reactions, and 
new directions. Part III.B.1 will describe how tax competition got 
onto the OECD agenda, how the global dialogue evolved, and 
what steps were ultimately taken. Part III.B.2 will then consider 
the specific and very strategic roles played by different 
international organizations in the process. 
1.  OECD’s Effort to Combat “Harmful” Tax Competition 
The OECD embodies a tripartite structure in which 
responsibilities are divided among a council, secretariat, and 
standing committees.257 Formal OECD decision-making power 
rests in the OECD Council, comprising a representative from 
each member state and one from the EU.258 The Council meets 
at the “session of Ministers”259 once a year “to discuss key issues 
 
253. An example is the competition between countries that collect and spend their 
revenues efficiently and those that do not. 
254. See Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue, supra note 252, ¶¶ 23, 43 
(forecasting that, in light of the globalized economy, tax policies in one jurisdiction are 
now more likely to have repercussions on another and specifically referencing the “race 
to the bottom”); see also Roin, supra note 249, at 550–54 (articulating the “race to the 
bottom” phenomenon as it relates to international tax competition). 
255. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 13, at 1578 (explaining that both labor and 
consumption would be less mobile than capital and investment). 
256. See id. at 1577–78. 
257. See Who Does What, http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_
36761791_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2010) (providing a graphical 
representation of the OECD’s structure). 
258. See Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development art. 7, Dec. 14, 1960, 12 U.S.T. 1728, 888 U.N.T.S. 179 [hereinafter OECD 
Convention]; see also Who Does What, supra note 257. 
259. That is, the minister of the economy for each country. 
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and set priorities.”260 Any work “mandated by the Council” is 
then carried out by the OECD Secretariat,261 including by 
delegation to one of the many OECD committees.262 One such 
committee, the CFA, was created by Council resolution on May 1, 
1971, and is responsible for tax matters.263 
In May 1996, the Council, through a ministerial 
communiqué, directed the OECD to “develop measures to 
counter the distorting effects of harmful tax competition on 
investment and financing decisions and the consequences for 
national tax bases, and report back in 1998.”264 Although the 
OECD did not identify the specific state members that instigated 
the organization’s focus on tax competition, both France and 
Japan were reported to be the primary advocates for the OECD’s 
involvement, with support coming from Germany and the United 
 
260. Who Does What, supra note 258. The Council meets at the permanent 
representative level regularly where decisions are made on a census basis. See id. The 
Council is headed by the Secretary-General of the OECD Secretariat. OECD 
Convention, supra note 258, art. 10(2). 
261.  Who Does What, supra note 257. The OECD Secretariat is headed by the 
Secretary-General who is assisted by deputy secretaries general and a significant staff. 
OECD Convention, supra note 258, art. 10(1); Organisation Chart, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/60/0,3343,en_36734052_36734103_37241660_
1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). The Paris-based staff of the Secretariat 
numbers approximately 2500 and includes lawyers, economists, and scientists. See Who 
Does What, supra note 257. 
262. Pursuant to article 9 of the OECD Convention, the Council may establish 
committees and subsidiary bodies as need be to achieve the objectives of the 
organization. OECD Convention, supra note 258, art. 9. The OECD currently has over 
200 committees, working groups, and expert groups pursuing the work of the 
organization. See Who Does What, supra note 257. For a list of all the committees, 
working groups, and other subsidiary bodies established by the Council in accordance 
with article 9, see On-Line Guide to OECD Intergovernmental Activity, 
http://webnet3.oecd.org/oecdgroups/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
263. See , OECD, Resolution of the Council Concerning the Activities of the Organisation 
in the Field of Taxation, Council Res. C(71)41 (May 1, 1971), revised by Council Res. 
C(2008)147 & C/M(2008)20, item 285 (Nov. 13, 2008), reprinted in OECD, DIRECTORY 
OF BODIES OF THE OECD 258 (2009 ed.); see also About the Centre for Tax Policy and 
Administration, http://www.oecd.org/about/0,3347,en_2649_34897_1_1_1_1_
1,00.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). The original 1971 resolution is excerpted at 
http://webnet3.oecd.org/oecdgroups/bodies.asp?body_id=963&lng=e, and partially 
reprinted in OECD, DIRECTORY OF BODIES OF THE OECD 255–56 (2008 ed.) [hereinafter 
OECD 2008 BODIES DIRECTORY]. 
264. See OECD, Council at Ministerial Level, Communiqué, ¶ 15(xv), May 21–22, 
2006, reprinted in 44 Eur. Y.B., at OECD 18 (1996). A copy of the communiqué is also 
electronically available at http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/oecd/oecd96.htm. 
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States.265 The interest of these four countries would not be 
surprising; they are generally viewed as relative “high” tax 
countries with significant capital and investment at stake. 
In response to the 1996 ministerial communiqué, the CFA 
organized the “Special Sessions on Tax Competition” chaired by 
France and Japan.266 Ultimately the special sessions prepared the 
Harmful Tax Competition report, which was adopted by the CFA 
in January 1998.267 In April 1998, the OECD Council approved 
the report, and directed the CFA to organize a forum on harmful 
tax practices and to initiate dialogue with nonmember states.268 
Additionally, the Council recommended a series of domestic 
legislative steps for member states to pursue.269 
The report addressed practices of OECD member 
countries270 and nonmember countries. Although acknowledging 
that tax competition occurs in many contexts, the report targeted 
geographically mobile activities (for example, financial services 
and the provision of intangibles).271 The two basic competition 
scenarios were selected by the report for remedy: (1) so-called 
“tax-haven” jurisdictions that impose virtually no income tax; and 
(2) countries that impose significant individual or corporate 
income taxes yet incorporate preferential features into the system 
to enable certain types of income earned by certain classes of 
taxpayers to face little or no taxation.272 At the outset, the report 
recognized that there was no intention to “explicitly or implicitly 
suggest that there was some general minimum effective rate of 
 
265. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 13, at 1603 (identifying France and Japan as the 
primary players); Jacqueline B., Manasterli, OECD, EU, U.S. Representatives Discuss Tax 
Haven Initiatives, 1999 TAX NOTES TODAY 112-9 (quoting chair of the Business and 
Industry Advisory Committee (“BIAC”) Taxation and Fiscal Committee, Richard M. 
Hammer as referencing “rumors” that the U.S. Treasury led the initiative). 
266. See Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue, supra note 252, ¶ 3. 
267. See id. 
268. See OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Counteracting Harmful Tax 
Competition, Council Res. C(98)17/FINAL, reprinted in OECD 2008 BODIES DIRECTORY, 
supra note 263, at 259–60. Switzerland and Luxembourg abstained from the vote. See id. 
n.1. 
269. See id. 
270. After the 1998 report, the Slovak Republic joined in 2000. See About the 
Slovak Republic, http://www.oecd.org/about/0,3347,en_33873108_
33873781_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
271. See Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue, supra note 252, ¶ 6. 
Other forms of competition were reserved for future study. See id. 
272. See id. ¶¶ 38–44. 
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tax to be imposed on income below which a country would be 
considered to be engaging in harmful tax competition.”273 Even 
the two scenarios targeted by the report were not uniformly 
chastised. The report identified specific factors that would lead 
these two basic scenarios to constitute “harmful practices”: (1) 
lack of effective exchange of information, (2) lack of 
transparency, (3) lack of substantial activities in the jurisdiction, 
and/or (4) special geographic or industry-limited tax regimes.274 
The report then detailed the reason for a collaborative, OECD-
level response to tax competition: 
The need for co-ordinated action at the international level is 
also apparent from the fact that the activities which are the 
main focus of this report are highly mobile. In this context, 
and in the absence of international cooperation, there is 
little incentive for a country which provides a harmful 
preferential tax regime to eliminate it since this could merely 
lead the activity to move to another country which continues 
to offer a preferential treatment.275 
Ultimately, the report urged various unilateral steps,276 treaty 
changes,277 and certain coordinated measures.278 Given the 
centrality of non-OECD members to matters of tax competition, 
the report also encouraged the new forum to “engage in a 
dialogue with non-member countries using, where appropriate, the 
fora offered by other international tax organizations, with the aim of 
promoting the Recommendations” of the report.279 
The OECD Council’s adoption of the report evoked much 
controversy. Both states and businesses benefiting from the 
current system did not welcome change. BIAC, the OECD’s 
 
273. Id. ¶ 41. 
274. See id. ¶¶ 52–55, 61–64 (identifying factors for tax havens and harmful 
preferential systems, respectively). 
275. Id. ¶ 89. 
276. See id. ¶¶ 97–112 (including, among others, strong controlled foreign 
corporation rules). Controlled foreign corporation, or “CFC,” rules proscribe 
circumstances in which a residence country may tax its resident corporations on income 
earned by their foreign subsidiaries in absence of a dividend distribution to the parent. 
See id. ¶ 97. 
277. See id. ¶¶ 113–37 (including, among others, the use of provisions on exchange 
of information and on treaty shopping). 
278. See id. ¶¶ 138–48 (including guidelines on harmful preferential tax regimes 
(even self-evaluation) and a new forum to implement the guidelines and to produce a 
list of tax havens against which to apply a coordinated response). 
279. Id. ¶ 156 (emphasis added). 
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“independent” business community representative body, reacted 
harshly to the report. In June 1999, at the European-American 
Business Council’s fourth annual conference, the BIAC Taxation 
Committee chair listed multiple critiques of the OECD project: 
(1) BIAC had no role in its preparation even though BIAC had 
been continuously involved in other important OECD 
international tax initiatives such as the development of the 
transfer pricing guidelines, (2) the OECD project reached 
beyond its own borders to control tax policy of nonmember 
states, and (3) the report would not have been issued in its actual 
form if BIAC were involved because businesses across the globe 
were unhappy with the end product.280 Several days earlier, BIAC 
issued a written response to the OECD report charging it with 
insufficient clarity, a return to artificial constraints on countries’ 
ability to choose their own tax system, an apparent promotion of 
high tax rates, and a failure to appreciate the benefits of 
competition.281 BIAC described the OECD report as “overblown” 
and sounding both a “sinister tone” and a “ring of arrogance.”282 
To the extent the OECD’s report identified valid concerns, BIAC 
urged OECD countries to adopt and strictly adhere to the already 
existing OECD transfer pricing guidelines.283 
At the end of June 1999, during a regularly scheduled 
meeting between BIAC and the CFA, tax competition dominated 
the agenda.284 In addition to the chair of BIAC and the 
representatives of the CFA, attendees included tax delegations 
from about twelve OECD members, including Australia, France, 
Germany, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States.285 Following the meeting, whose contents were 
not disclosed, a U.S. attendee, Joseph Feuer, manager of 
 
280. See Manasterli, supra note 265, at 2383 (quoting Chair of the BIAC Taxation 
and Fiscal Committee, Richard M. Hammer). 
281. See Business and Industry Advisory Committee [BIAC], A Business View on Tax 
Competition, June 1999, reprinted in 40 EUR. TAX’N 421 (2000). A copy of the report can 
also be found in 19 TAX NOTES INT’L 281 (1999) and is available at 
http://www.biac.org/statements/tax/htc.pdf. 
282. See A Business View on Tax Competition, supra note 281, annex 1. 
283. See id. para. 18. 
284. See Robert Goulder, OECD Takes Exception with BIAC’s Exception to OECD Tax 
Haven Report, 19 TAX NOTES INT’L 227 (1999) (the U.S. delegation included “several 
corporate representatives”). 
285. See Goulder, supra note 284, at 227 (reporting that the U.S. delegation 
included “several corporate representatives”). 
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European affairs and taxation with the U.S. Council for 
International Business in New York, reported that the CFA was 
displeased that BIAC had strongly criticized the 1998 report, but 
that both sides recognized that some form of reconciliation was 
necessary to produce constructive results.286 
Of course not all organizations objected to the OECD’s work 
in tax competition. When the Group of Seven (“G7”) met in 
June 1999 and again in September 1999, they praised the 
OECD’s creation of a forum on harmful tax practices and 
supported the OECD’s effort to identify tax havens.287 To address 
both tax evasion and money laundering, the G7 encouraged the 
OECD to enhance the exchange of information between tax 
authorities.288 
As the OECD’s initiative through the forum on harmful tax 
practices continued, further challenges to the work of the OECD 
emerged from several different quarters. In 2000, the OECD 
released a progress report identifying thirty-five “tax havens,” as 
defined by the criterion set out in its 1998 report.289 The United 
States, in apparent opposition to the OECD’s report naming 
havens, organized a campaign against the tax competition 
project. A dominant actor in this campaign was the CFP, which 
itself was organized in October 2000.290 The CFP identified its 
“top project” as “the Coalition for Tax Competition, which is 
fighting to preserve jurisdictional tax competition, sovereignty, 
and financial privacy.”291 The CFP characterized the OECD’s 
efforts as “ill-advised” and argued that the OECD was trying to 
“bully ‘tax havens’ into raising their tax rates and eliminating 
 
286. Id. 
287. See European Commission, G-7 Meets, Pledges to Combat Harmful Tax 
Competition, 19 TAX NOTES INT’L 250, 250, (1999); Robert Goulder, G-7 Officials Discuss 
Harmful Tax Competition, 19 TAX NOTES INT’L 1303, 1303 (1999). The G-7 also expressed 
support for a related, but narrower, project underway in the European Union to 
implement a “business code of conduct” to limit harmful tax competition. See European 
Commission, supra, at 250. 
288. See European Commission, supra note 287; Goulder, supra note 287. 
289. See OECD, Towards Global Tax Co-operation: Report to the 2000 Ministerial Council 
Meeting and Recommendations by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs, at 17, June 26, 2000, 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/27/44430257.pdf. 
290. See CF&P At-a-Glance, supra note 68. 
291. Id. For more information on the CFP, see Ring, supra note 17, at 187–97. 
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financial privacy, [and was] assert[ing] the right to interfere with 
American tax laws.”292 
Having decided to marshal its resources against the OECD 
tax competition project, the CFP pursued two major directions. 
The first prong of the attack was to lobby the U.S. Congress and 
the U.S. administration against the OECD plan.293 As a direct 
result of the CFP’s lobbying, 294 members of Congress, including 
members of the Congressional Black Caucus, questioned or 
objected to U.S. participation in the OECD project295 and sent 
letters—often times quite similar to one another—to U.S. 
Secretary of the Treasury Paul O’Neill and other key political 
figures detailing their objections.296 The culmination of the CFP’s 
 
292. See CF&P At-a-Glance, supra note 68. 
293. See Robert Goulder, New Coalition Strikes Back at OECD Tax Havens Campaign, 
21 TAX NOTES INT’L 2650, 2653–54 (2000) (reporting on interviews with CFP founders 
Mitchell and Quinlan who describe their plans to attack the OECD tax competition 
project). 
294. See David S. Cloud, Virginian Fights for International Tax Havens—Lobbyist Finds 
Bush Receptive to Ideas Clinton Rejected, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2001, at A20 (reviewing the 
lobbying efforts of the CFP and quoting its co-founder Andrew Quinlan: “We’re going to 
end up generating probably 100,000 pieces of mail”); Goulder, supra note 293 (quoting 
CFP co-founder Quinlan: “What our coalition has, which no one else can claim, is that 
we are now set to successfully deal with Congress. We have already met with the key 
players.”); see also, e.g., Alex Easson, Harmful Tax Competition: An Evaluation of the OECD 
Initiative, 34 TAX NOTES INT’L 1037, 1053–55 (2004) (describing how the CFP plan 
worked); Field, supra note 68, at 1242–43 (same). 
295. Majority House Leader Richard K. Armey was the first major member of 
Congress to speak out against the OECD tax competition work and to urge the then 
Secretary of the Treasury Lawrence Summers to “withdraw U.S. support for the 
initiative.” Goulder, supra note 293, at 2653. Comments by Representative Armey 
marked the CFP’s success on the Congressional front: “By fighting against an 
international tax cartel and working to preserve financial privacy, the Center for 
Freedom and Prosperity is protecting taxpayers, both in America and around the 
world.” Id. The members of the Congressional Black Caucus focused their critique on 
the harm caused to poorer nations, especially those in the neighboring Caribbean. See, 
e.g., Field, supra note 68 (“Even the Black Caucus was induced to speak out against the 
OECD plan, on the basis of solidarity with people of color living in Caribbean tax 
havens.”); see also Cordia Scott & Adrion Howell, Congressional Black Caucus Says OECD 
Tax Move Unfairly Blasts Developing Nations, 22 TAX NOTES INT’L 1600, 1600–01 (2001). A 
letter signed by twenty-six of the thirty-eight members of the caucus and addressed to 
Secretary of the Treasury, Paul O’Neill, echoed this concern. See infra note 296. 
296. Many of these congressional letters were reprinted in Tax Notes International, 
including letters by Senator Don Nickles, and Representatives Sam Johnson, Major R. 
Owens, and Richard K. Armey. See Ring, supra note 17, at 188 n.135; see also Cordia Scott, 
House Majority Leader, Congressional Black Caucus Members Join Growing List of U.S. 
Lawmakers Opposed to OECD Tax Haven Campaign, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Mar. 21, 2001, 
2001 WTD 55-1 (reporting on, and linking to, letters from House representatives to the 
U.S. Treasury Secretary expressing disapproval of the OECD’s international campaign 
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lobbying campaign came in May 2001, when U.S. Secretary of the 
Treasury Paul O’Neill published a statement that was the product 
of several months of the new U.S. administration’s increasingly 
hostile posture towards the OECD tax competition project: 
The United States does not support efforts to dictate to any 
country what its own tax rates or tax systems should be, and 
will not participate in any initiative to harmonize world tax 
systems. The United States simply has no interest in stifling 
the competition that forces governments—like businesses—
to create efficiencies. 297 
This aggressive U.S. critique and withdrawal of support was 
perceived as a significant blow to the tax competition work.298 
Secretary O’Neill’s position “was considered by most tax experts 
to represent a misreading of the tax competition project, which 
did not propose rate harmonization and did not reject 
competition of all types.”299 Despite the fact that the United 
States ultimately backpedaled on Secretary O’Neill’s language 
and continued to support the project in what became a modified 
form, the end result was a tax competition effort mostly focused 
on information exchange and a “major retreat from the OECD’s 
original tax competition goals.”300 
In addition to its lobbying activities in the United States, the 
CFP engaged the identified tax havens directly. The CFP issued 
press releases and statements on the OECD tax competition 
 
against harmful tax competition). A list of Congress members sending letters, along with 
copies, are also posted on the CFP website. See Congressional Letters on the OECD’s 
“Harmful Tax Competition” Project, http://www.freedomandprosperity.org/congress/
congress.shtml (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). For a copy of the letter sent by the 
Congressional Black Caucus, see Letter from the Cong. Black Caucus to Paul O’Neill, 
U.S. Sec’y of the Treasury (Mar. 14, 2001), available at 
http://www.freedomandprosperity.org/cbc.pdf. 
297. Paul O’Neill, Op-Ed., Confronting OECD's Notions on Taxation, WASH. TIMES, 
May 10, 2001, at A15. A copy of the Treasury press release is reprinted in 22 TAX NOTES 
INT’L 2617 (2001), and is also available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/
po366.htm. 
298. Although at the time, the strong U.S. rebuke of the OECD project was 
envisioned as a serious problem (particularly given the strong support previously 
provided by the United States), later analyses have argued that the ultimate course of 
history indicates that the anticipated harm to the work did not materialize. See Hugh J. 
Ault, Reflections on the Role of the OECD in Developing International Tax Norms, 34 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 757, 770–71 (2009). 
299. Ring, supra note 17, at 189 (citing Field, supra note 70). 
300. Field, supra note 70. 
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project, and “organized” many of the Caribbean havens.301 In a 
very strategic move, CFP founders, including Dan Mitchell, 
attended the 24th Annual Conference on Caribbean and Latin 
American Economies, in early December 2000.302 Mitchell also 
spoke on behalf of the CFP at the Bahamas Bar Association in 
December 2000.303 This trip had “followed a period during which 
several key Bahamian officials held consultative discussions with 
OECD representatives.”304 Several weeks later in Barbados, the 
CFP sponsored a symposium on the OECD tax competition 
project.305 During its time in the Caribbean, CFP successfully 
persuaded Antigua to “designate [the two CFP founders] as its 
official delegates to [the] January OECD summit with other 
Caribbean tax-haven countries in Barbados.”306 Then, in late 
February 2001, the CFP again held a strategic meeting in Paris a 
few days before an OECD meeting.307 
In the decade since the 1998 report, the OECD has 
developed criteria to determine haven status, issued a series of 
progress reports on tax competition, and prepared, revised, and 
published various lists of tax havens. As the OECD itself recently 
described this process and its goals: 
[The 1998 report] initiated a period of intense dialogue 
aimed at eliminating preferential tax regimes within OECD 
Member states, identifying “tax havens” and seeking their 
commitments to the principles of transparency and effective 
exchange of information and encouraging other non-OECD 
economies to associate themselves with the harmful tax 
practices work.308 
With respect to its success, the OECD observed that 
 
301. See Cloud, supra note 294. 
302. See, e.g., Goulder, supra note 293, at 2653 (describing CFP planned action at 
the 24th Annual Conference on Caribbean and Latin American Economies). 
303. See Linda Thompson, CFP’s Mitchell Warns Bahamas Against OECD Cooperation, 
22 TAX NOTES INT’L 157, 157 (2001). 
304. Id. 
305. See Robert Goulder, U.S. Congressional Staffer: Opposition to OECD Tax Haven 
Campaign May Be Growing in Washington, 22 TAX NOTES INT’L 236, 236 (2001). 
306. Cloud, supra note 296. 
307. See Trevor Drury, Center for Freedom and Prosperity Meets in Paris, 22 TAX NOTES 
INT’L 1201, 1201 (2001). 
308. OECD, Promoting Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, ¶ 
25, Apr. 21, 2010, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/45/43757434.pdf 
(emphasis added). 
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[b]y 2004, all but one of the preferential tax regimes 
identified within the OECD had been abolished, amended or 
found not to be harmful. The only outstanding regime was 
the Luxembourg 1929 holding company regime. In 
December 2006, Luxembourg enacted legislation to abolish 
the regime by the end of 2010.309. 
The OECD worked steadily to increase the involvement of both 
the business community and non-member states. For example, 
after the OECD published its progress report in 2000 on tax 
havens, it held a symposium in Paris to discuss harmful tax 
practices and their implications.310 Twenty-nine nonmember 
states attended the symposium.311 In September 2008, the OECD 
“[f]or the first time, . . . opened its doors and welcomed private-
sector specialists to its annual meeting of government 
officials.”312 At that same meeting, “[d]elegates from countries as 
diverse as Argentina and Georgia, Zambia and Brazil, and 
Singapore and Iran participated as equals.”313 Moreover, the 
decline in corporate tax rates across OECD member countries 
(rates now more than twenty percentage points lower than in the 
mid 1980s) powerfully signaled that the OECD was not trying to 
harmonize tax rates at a high level314—a charge that had been 
leveled against it following the 1998 report. 
With its tax competition work now focused on ensuring 
transparency and information exchange, the OECD directed its 
attention to defining, measuring, and monitoring compliance 
with these goals. Although myriad havens have “committed” to 
achieving transparency and participating in exchange of 
information through tax information exchange agreements,315 
do these promises have any bite? A “commitment” does not 
 
309. Id. ¶ 25 n. 2. 
310. See Goulder, supra note 123. 
311. See The OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax Practices: The 2001 Progress Report, supra 
note 122, ¶ 14. 
312. Joann M. Weiner, News Analysis: Change Is in the Air at the OECD, 51 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 1006, 1006 (2006). 
313. Id. 
314. See id. 
315. See OECD, Promoting Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, 
supra note 308, ¶ 10 (noting that in 2009 alone almost 200 tax information exchange 
agreements and 110 double taxation conventions were concluded or revised with 
language committing its signatories to engage in transparency and exchange of 
information). 
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equal execution of the steps—and even the signing of an 
information exchange agreement does not ensure meaningful 
compliance.316 
The OECD efforts to support and foster exchange of 
information have received repeated support from other 
governmental bodies. For example, on July 8, 2009, the Group of 
Eight (“G8”) issued a declaration which, among other points, 
urged the OECD to “now concentrate on implementing actual 
exchange of information and increasing the number, quality and 
relevance of the agreements that adhere to [OECD] standards” 
and to discuss and agree to a “toolbox of effective counter 
measures for countries to consider for use against countries that 
do not meet international standards in relation to 
transparency.”317 The G8 is a body comprised of eight of the 
major industrialized nations—Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (the 
EU, through the European Commission, attends the G8 meetings 
but does not hold a formal role).318 Although the website for last 
year’s G8 summit319 states that it “is not an international 
organisation, nor does it have an administrative staff with a 
permanent secretariat,”320 it also notes that the G8 has a rotating 
presidency “taken on by each country in turn, which works to 
define the topics to be placed on the agenda and the priorities 
for action, and to identify the fresh goals and sectors of 
intervention.”321 
 
316. See, e.g., OECD, Promoting Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax 
Purposes, supra note 308, ¶ 10; Ault, supra note 298, at 770–72; Charles Gnaedinger et al., 
News Analysis: Tax Havens Play Nice with OECD—For Now, 54 TAX NOTES INT’L 103, 103–
05 (2009). 
317. Group of Eight, Declaration, Responsible Leadership for a Sustainable Future, ¶¶ 
17(b), (f) (July 8, 2009), available at http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8_Allegato/
G8_Declaration_08_07_09_final,0.pdf. 
318. See About the G8 (Mar. 17, 2010), http://g8.gc.ca/about/. 
319. Each year, a new website is sponsored by the country holding the presidency 
for that year. For this year’s website, see The Muskoka G8 Summit, 
http://g8.gc.ca/home (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
320. How the G8 Works, http://www.g8italia2009.it/g8/home/approfondimenti/
g8-G8_layout_locale-1199882116809_comefunzionag8.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
Instead the website characterizes the actions of the body as “a process that culminates in 
an annual Summit at which the Heads of State and Government of the member 
countries hold talks with a view to finding solutions to the main world issues, which are 
summed up in the ‘Final Statement.’” Id. 
321. Id. 
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Similarly, in 2009, the Group of Twenty (“G20”) issued 
words of encouragement for the OECD’s information exchange 
work: 
We note that the OECD has today published a list of 
countries assessed by the Global Forum [as] against the 
international standard for exchange of information. We 
welcome the new commitments made by a number of 
jurisdictions and encourage them to proceed swiftly with 
implementation. We stand ready to take agreed action 
against those jurisdictions which do not meet international 
standards in relation to tax transparency.322 
The G20 includes those countries that are members of the G8, 
plus a broad range of other nations, including Argentina, 
Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.323 The G20 serves as a 
meeting of finance ministers and central bank governors that was 
established to provide regular economic discussions among 
industrial and developing nations.324 In addition to the nineteen 
member countries, the EU sits in (through the European 
Council presidency and the European Central Bank) as the 
twentieth member.325 Moreover, other international 
organizations with a specific monetary focus have an explicit but 
unofficial role: 
To ensure global economic fora and institutions work 
together, the Managing Director of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the President of the World Bank, 
plus the chairs of the International Monetary and Financial 
Committee and Development Committee of the IMF and 
World Bank, also participate in G-20 meetings on an ex-
officio basis.326 
 
322. Group of Twenty, Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System, at 4 (Apr. 2, 
2009), available at http://g20.org/documents/
fin_deps_fin_reg_annex_020409_-_1615_final.pdf. 
323. See What is the G-20, http://www.g20.org/about_what_is_g20.aspx (last visited 
Apr. 3, 2010). 
324. See id. 
325. See id. 
326. Id. Like the Group of Eight, the Group of Twenty emphasizes that it is a more 
informal organization with no permanent staff, and only a rotating presidency. The 
finance ministers and central bank governors meet on an annual basis. Prior to that 
meeting, there are deputy level meetings and technical work, including “workshops, 
reports and case studies on specific subjects, that aim to provide ministers and governors 
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The OECD’s push, in the context of the tax competition 
project, for effective exchange of information between countries 
received a notable boost from a series of banking scandals that 
erupted over the past year and a half. In these scandals, the most 
publicized of which involved UBS, taxpayers hid their assets and 
income offshore with the assistance of “reputable” banking 
institutions.327 Some of these banks had even entered into 
agreements with the United States in which they were permitted 
to use certain streamlined reporting and withholding procedures 
in return for agreeing to ascertain and confirm the tax status of 
their account holders.328 The measures that these institutions 
took to hide assets directly contravened their own existing 
commitments and their clients’ tax reporting obligations.329 
These events in the banking world did not create the 
transparency and exchange of information initiative, but they did 
accelerate the pace at which countries, many of them frequently 
identified as havens, began signing formal exchange of 
information agreements.330 Even Switzerland, a long-standing 
holdout on bank secrecy, has since signed exchange of 
information agreements with four OECD members and initialed 
agreements with at least eight other members.331 In addition, 
Switzerland, along with Austria, Belgium, and Luxembourg, 
withdrew their opposition the OECD’s exchange of information 
provision in the model treaty.332 As a result, all OECD members 
have now approved this standard.333 
 
with contemporary analysis and insights, to better inform their consideration of policy 
challenges and options.” Id. 
327. See supra notes 5–7. 
328. See Lynnley Browning, U.S. Details Executive; Deepening UBS Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 8, 2008, at C3. 
329. See Nick Mathiason, Tax Scandal Leaves Swiss Giant Reeling, OBSERVER 
(London), June 29, 2008, at 4; see also Hilzenrath, supra note 5. 
330. See, e.g., Press Release, OECD, Bermuda Signs Eight New Tax Information 
Agreements (Apr. 17, 2009), available at http://www.oecd.org/document/4/
0,3343,en_2649_33767_42578308_1_1_1_1,00.html; Press Release, OECD, Cayman 
Islands Signs Tax Information Agreements With Nordic Economies (Apr. 1, 2009), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/document/9/
0,3343,en_2649_33767_42482889_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
331. See OECD Assessment Shows Bank Secrecy as a Shield for Tax Evaders Coming to an 
End, 2009 WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY 167-16. 
332. See id. 
333. See David Stewart, OECD Report Highlights Progress on Information Exchange, 55 
TAX NOTES INT’L 808, 808 (2009). 
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2. Analysis of the Tax Competition Story 
Although the rich history that began with the OECD tax 
competition project and now plays out in the effort to secure 
meaningful transparency and exchange of information cannot be 
fully captured in a few pages, this case study affords the 
opportunity to make certain observations on the role of 
international organizations. 
About the issue. Tax competition was initially perceived as a 
problem at the individual country level. Unfortunately, unilateral 
solutions can be limited so long as other countries continue to 
compete and refuse to exchange taxpayer information. Not 
surprisingly, countries concerned about the effects of tax 
competition would turn to an international organization—but 
not just any organization. It needed to be one whose 
membership would, on balance, be receptive to these concerns. 
It also needed to be an organization of sufficient size such that its 
actions could have adequate reach, both in disciplining members 
and in persuading or threatening nonmembers. 
About the actors. The OECD was the logical choice. However, 
as events revealed, revenue-protecting countries were not the 
only actors deeply concerned by these questions. The decision 
not to substantially engage the business community or tax haven 
jurisdictions produced (or at least facilitated the creation of) a 
vocal backlash to the 1998 OECD report. BIAC’s repeated 
comments revealed a strong negative reaction not just to the 
content of the report but also to businesses’ exclusion from the 
process.334 Ten years later, in September 2008, BIAC’s tax chair, 
Patrick Ellingsworth observed: 
[I]n the last few years, we have seen a welcome reversal of 
the controversy that had arisen over the OECD’s work on the 
harmful tax competition project. The project, as an inquiry 
into global tax practice, was a good project, but it 
misdirected resources away from the OECD’s main 
purposes. . . . There was some good that came out of this 
criticism, as the project eventually evolved into a project 
 
334. See supra note 280. 
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largely involving information exchange. It seems to be 
working fine as such.335 
Additionally, the CFP’s intervention and advocacy against 
the OECD project demonstrated strategic appreciation for the 
variety of important international actors. The CFP’s coordinated 
efforts to influence individuals and groups in the U.S. Congress, 
to publish frequent policy papers, and to coordinate a tax haven 
“revolt” against the OECD undermined support for the OECD’s 
1998 report and project.336 Although the OECD itself was the 
organization pushing the tax competition issue, the OECD did 
not and could not operate in a vacuum. To the extent the CFP 
published competing articulations of tax competition and 
healthy international tax policy, these alternative positions could 
influence the undecided, galvanize supporters, and solidify the 
arguments of the opposition. Moreover, if support inside the 
OECD fractured, the organization’s ability to aggressively pursue 
its agenda could be compromised. The efforts to influence the 
U.S. executive branch through Congressional opposition resulted 
in a formal change in the official U.S. position on the OECD 
project.337 This shift was widely considered a blow to the OECD’s 
work even though the tax competition project later shifted its 
focus successfully towards transparency and exchange of 
information.338 
Even the transparency and exchange of information agenda 
benefited from the support offered by other international 
organizations with overlapping but distinct membership, such as 
the G8 and the G20. Their explicit encouragement of the 
OECD’s work here provided momentum and a signal that the 
mission now reflected broader international tax principles.339 
Policy Development. The basic story of the tax competition 
projects reveals several interesting interactions and decisions, 
 
335. Joann M. Weiner, Members of BIAC, 51 TAX NOTES INT’L, 1014, 1014 (2008) 
(quoting Patrick Ellingsworth, Chair of the BIAC Committee on Taxation and Fiscal 
Affairs). 
336. See supra notes 290–307 
337. See supra note 297 and accompanying text. 
338. See supra note 298 and accompanying text. 
339. See OECD, Press Release, Moves By Financial Centres Boost OECD Fight 
Against Tax Evasion (Mar. 12, 2009), available at http://www.oecd.org/document/16/
0,3343,en_2649_201185_42339984_1_1_1_1,00.html; see also Responsible Leadership for a 
Sustainable Future, supra note 317; Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System, supra 
note 322. 
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including: (1) Japan’s and France’s effort to harness the 
collective force of the OECD to pursue a tax issue high on their 
agendas, (2) the OECD’s effort to draft a document that 
captured its members’ reasoning (although later OECD efforts 
reflected a growing appreciation of reaching beyond member 
states), (3) the powerful role played by taxpayer advocacy groups 
who strategically and simultaneous lobbied different segments of 
Congress and the haven states, (4) the reality that national 
positions such as the one initially espoused by the United States 
on tax competition are not uniform or static—but can reflect the 
emergence of an initial view that may later succumb to lobbying, 
and (5) the active engagement of academics and other bodies on 
the desirability of the OECD project. More broadly, the shift over 
time of the OECD’s focus from harmful tax competition to 
transparency and exchange of information was itself the result of 
the interplay of these forces through and on the OECD. 
CONCLUSION 
These two initial case studies document the active and 
complex role played by a variety of international organizations in 
shaping tax policy. A sophisticated consideration of the impact of 
membership, structure, agenda setting, and outputs, helps 
explain the choices, patterns, and interactions seen in these two 
cases. Where, for example, impetus for change comes from the 
taxpayer side, an organization dedicated to the business 
community can be a sensible launching point. However, given 
that tax changes must ultimately be an act of the state, support 
from a state-based international organization becomes 
imperative. The choice of which state-based organization reflects 
a prediction about the probability of getting the matter on the 
agenda and moving it through to a successful conclusion. Save 
for organizations focused on tax planning (or even evasion), 
most organizations ultimately intend their output to either 
directly or indirectly reach state actors. Of course, if the original 
organization is itself state-based it might not always reach beyond 
its membership. If a particular issue is regional, topical, or 
sensitive and does not require broader participation for its 
adequate resolution, then limited involvement may be 
appropriate. Although neither case study represents such a 
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situation, the mission of JITSIC (Joint International Tax Shelter 
Information Centre) discussed in Part II.B.1.b. would.340 
Organizations also display an organic quality, adjusting as 
circumstances and expectations change. Consider two different 
examples: First, following the backlash over its tax competition 
project, the OECD increased (both in quantity and depth) its 
involvement and interactions with nonmember states. Second, 
PATA (an organization focused on administrative and 
compliance matters) originally had four member states—
however, after several years, it morphed into the Leeds Castle 
group presumably because the members found the issues 
important, more universal, and the operations valuable. That 
said, it did not jump to a forty-member size which would likely 
have made implausible, at least at this stage, the kind of mutual 
information sharing that can occur among a still small subset of 
countries with similar developed economies and income tax 
expectations. 
The examination of international tax policy formation 
through international tax organizations illustrates the relevance 
of IR theory regarding international organizations and the 
international agreement process. The value of the cognitivists’ 
focus on knowledge and belief—including their attention to 
expertise and epistemic communities—emerged at various 
junctures in both case studies, for example: (1) the ICC body 
assessing mandatory arbitration was composed of “experts” in 
international tax; (2) the ICC 2006 conference, which was 
designed to resolve residual questions on arbitration, relied on a 
panel “of prominent experts in . . . international tax and 
international arbitration”;341 (3) the CFP, in its effort to 
influence the general perception of the OECD’s tax competition 
project and the empirical and policy arguments regarding 
competition, began and continue to draft articles and 
commentary for publication in tax journals; and (4) the effort by 
interested international organizations to assign special 
committees to prepare documented reports outlining the policy 
foundations for any recommendations. Additionally, certain 
international organizations themselves may effectively serve as 
experts, or epistemic communities—for example the EATLP or 
 
340. See supra notes 84–87. 
341. Press Release, ICC, supra note 225. 
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the IBFD, both of which have a research-based mission. Does this 
status influence the way in which other international 
organizations seek to engage with them? 
The broader visions of IR captured by the debate between 
the neorealists and the neoliberals direct us to consider the 
nature of the problems at issue in each case study and precisely 
what they “require” for resolution. Power does not seem to be a 
dominant element behind the agreements on mandatory 
arbitration. The initiative drew upon a widespread taxpayer base, 
not a subset of states. Additionally, resistance by states was more 
likely a function of their general sovereignty concerns over the 
possibility that arbitration might reduce their existing taxing 
authority. 
As with the double taxation problems prompting the 
original development of the tax treaty framework, tax 
competition can exist between comparable states with similar 
investment flows and revenues. Thus, agreement on harmful tax 
competition and practices (at least within the OECD) more 
plausibly reflects efficiencies created by the agreement process, 
and thus support neoliberalism. Further research on 
international tax organizations might illuminate whether the 
active participation of certain kinds of organizations are more 
indicative of an international agreement dictated by power 
(neorealism) or by efficiency goals (neoliberalism). 
The story of harmful tax competition does reveal, though, 
the potential overlay of power on agreements propelled 
substantially by market failure. Recall that modern IR theory 
suggests that neither neorealism nor neoliberalism likely 
captures the full picture of international decision-making. Even 
the critique offered by the neorealists is that neoliberalism gives 
inadequate attention to power, not that it disregards power 
entirely. Where might power be relevant here? Although the 
initial agreement on harmful tax competition occurred within 
the OECD and identified OECD member regimes that were 
harmful and required modification or elimination, there was an 
important external component as well. Part of the OECD report 
targeted tax havens that were not OECD members. Given that 
most of these countries were smaller and poorer, opponents of 
the OECD characterized the OECD position on these havens as 
an aggressive, unseemly power move. Regardless of whether these 
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charges stand (one could counter that havens had been forced 
by market failure to engage in competition that did not serve 
them well), it is certainly plausible that concerted action through 
a state-based organization could draw upon coercive power. This 
inquiry raises an even broader question: What, if anything, do 
international organizations owe to nonmembers? Is it merely the 
same duties the members themselves would owe? Is it a higher 
duty because the organization gains a unique leverage and 
influence beyond that possessed by its members? Should the 
answer differ depending on whether the organization is state-
based or not? Further research on the real role and operations of 
international tax organizations in setting international tax policy 
is essential as we formulate our normative vision for these 
influential organizations. 
APPENDIX 
International Tax Organizations with State Membership 
Centre de Rencontre et d’Etudes des Dirigeants des 
Administrations Fiscales (CREDAF) 
Commonwealth Association of Tax Administrations (CATA) 
Inter-American Centre for Tax Administrations 
International Tax and Investment Organisation (ITIO) 
Intra-European Organisation of Tax Administrations (IOTA) 
Leeds Castle Group 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) 
Pacific Association of Tax Administrators (PATA) 
Seven Country Working Group 
United Nations (U.N.) 
International Tax Organizations with Non-state Membership 
Business and Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC) 
Center for Freedom and Prosperity (CFP) 
Confederation Fiscale Europeenne (CFE) 
European American Tax Institute (EATI) 
European Association of Tax Law Professors (EATLP) 
European Taxpayers Association 
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Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) 
Institute for Professionals in Taxation (IPT) 
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD) 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) 
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) 
International Fiscal Association 
International Tax Dialogue (ITD) 
International Tax Planning Association (ITPA) 
Tax Executive Institution (TEI) 
United States Council for International Business (USCIB) 
World Taxpayers Associations 
